Issues facing the modern consumer : topics in industrial organisation and decision-making by Ronayne, David
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/77579
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Issues facing the modern consumer: topics
in industrial organisation and
decision-making
by
David Ronayne
Thesis
Submitted to the University of Warwick
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
September 2015
Contents
Acknowledgements 1
Declaration 2
Abstract 3
Chapter 1. Price Comparison Websites
Introduction 4
Literature 7
Model 9
Comparative Statics 14
Competing Aggregators 17
Publicly-Observable Fees 21
Price Discrimination 22
The Extensive Search Margin 24
Conclusion 27
Appendix 28
References 49
Chapter 2. Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling: An Account of the Attrac-
tion, Compromise and Similarity Effects
Introduction 55
Context Effects 57
Literature 58
Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling 60
Experiments 66
Discussion 79
Appendix A - Methodological Details 82
Appendix B - Sufficient Conditions for Context Effects 84
References 92
Chapter 3. E-Cigarettes: The Extent and Impact of Complementary Dual-Use
Introduction 100
Model 102
The Survey 105
Cost Benefit Analysis 113
Conclusion 120
References 121
Supplementary Appendix 127
List of Figures
Chapter 1. Price Comparison Websites
Figure 1: Equilibrium price distributions 15
Chapter 2. Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling: An Account of the Attrac-
tion, Compromise and Similarity Effects
Figure 1: Context effects 58
Figure 2: Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling 62
Figure 3: Attraction effect 64
Figure 4: Compromise effect 65
Figure 5: Similarity effect 66
Figure 6: Screen-shot of manipulation 68
Figure 7: Manipulating choice: method 69
Figure 8: Manipulating context effects: method 71
Figure 9: Manipulating context effects: evidence 71
Figure 10: Screen-capture of distribution elicitation 74
Figure 11: Plotting data 76
Figure A1: Hotel data 82
Figure A2: Manipulating context effects: evidence (all) 83
Chapter 3. E-Cigarettes: The Extent and Impact of Complementary Dual-Use
Figure 1: Screen-shot of the Substitute or Complement Question 107
Figure 2: Empirical CDF of Responses to the Question of Figure 1 108
Figure 3: Empirical CDF Decomposed by Quit Status 110
List of Tables
Chapter 2: Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling: An Account of the Attrac-
tion, Compromise and Similarity Effects
Table 1: Manipulating choice 70
Table 2: Predicting individuals choices 78
Table A1: Choice sets 83
Chapter 3: E-Cigarettes: The Extent and Impact of Complementary Dual-Use
Table 1: Respondent Demographics 106
Table 2: The Perception Gap 109
Table 3: Characteristics of Complementary and Substitutive Dual-Users 112
Table 4: Cost-Benefit Analysis Scenarios 119
Acknowledgements
I thank my supervisors Motty Perry and Daniel Sgroi for their assistance and guid-
ance throughout the PhD. I also thank Dan Bernhardt for his help and time over the final
two years of the program. Chapter-specific acknowledgements are as follows:
Price Comparison Websites
I thank Dan Bernhardt, Rani Spiegler, Motty Perry, Daniel Sgroi, Kobi Glazer, An-
drew Oswald, Alessandro Iaria and Giulio Trigilia for their helpful discussion. I also
thank participants of the RES and EARIE 2015 conferences alongside those at various
other seminars.
Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling: An Account of the Attraction, Compromise and
Similarity Effects
I thank Gordon Brown (co-author), Neil Stewart, Takao Noguchi, Konstantinos
Tsetsos, Daniel Sgroi, Andrew Oswald, Sudeep Bhatia, Timothy Mullett, Lukasz Walasek
and Mario Sanclemente, participants of 2014 Bristol Decision-Making Conference and
the Decision Research at Warwick Forum for helpful comments and discussion. I thank
Andrew Taylor for his programming and software services. The work was supported
by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number ES/K002201/1) and the
Leverhulme Trust (grant number RP2012-V-022).
E-Cigarettes: The Extent and Impact of Complementary Dual-Use
I thank Daniel Sgroi (co-author), Chris Doyle (co-author), Monica Giovanniello,
Abhinay Muthoo and members of the Warwick Policy Lab for their discussion and
comments. Funding was provided by the Warwick Policy Lab. Ethical approval for the
survey was obtained from the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Com-
mittee at the University of Warwick on 21 November 2014 under reference 46/14-15.
1
Declarations
This thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university. Any errors in
this thesis are my responsibility. The chapters are products of varying levels of collab-
oration, as follows: Price Comparison Websites, solely my own work; Multi-Attribute
Decision by Sampling: An Account of the Attraction, Compromise and Similarity Ef-
fects, co-authored with Gordon Brown (Department of Psychology, University of War-
wick); E-Cigarettes: The Extent and Impact of Complementary Dual-Use, co-authored
with Daniel Sgroi (my supervisor) and Chris Doyle (Department of Economics, Uni-
versity of Warwick). All data analysis, figures and tables in this thesis were composed
my me.
2
Abstract
This thesis deals with specific topics within industrial organisation and consumer
choice. The first chapter “Price Comparison Websites” deals with a new and growing
multi-billion dollar industry that has emerged and flourished over the last two decades.
Price comparison websites (PCWs) or ‘web aggregators’ are poised to benefit con-
sumers by increasing competitive pricing pressure on firms by acquainting shoppers
with more prices. However, these sites also charge firms for sales which feeds back to
raise prices. I find that the introduction of a PCW increases prices for all consumers.
I then consider market outcomes with competing PCWs, fee-transparency, price dis-
crimination and costly search. The findings suggest the industry may in fact not benefit
any consumers, regardless of whether they actually use the sites, and that regulatory
solutions are not as simple as they may seem.
The second chapter “Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling: An Account of the At-
traction, Compromise and Similarity Effects” (MADS) proposes and tests a theory that
offers an explanation of the three major puzzles, known as ‘context effects’, observed
in multi-attribute choice: the attraction, compromise and similarity effects. Existing
models within the judgement and decision-making (JDM) literature all propose com-
plex choice architectures that cannot explain all three effects for the same reason and in
most cases, the models are only computationally solvable. Our approach is based on a
single mechanism, able to explain all three effects simultaneously and permits analytic
expressions for choice probabilities. MADS combines and extends three independently-
developed ideas from psychology: (i) that individuals compare choice alternatives with
comparison items; (ii) that comparisons are based on simple dominance relations; and
(iii) that comparison items are systematically influenced by the choice set faced. In a
novel experimental design involving 1,200 online participants and real-world data on
hotel stays, we find support for our theory’s account. In fact, our treatment was strong
enough to make the classic context effects appear and disappear. It is concluded that
a single-mechanism model, Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling, can account for the
three classic context effects.
In the third chapter “E-Cigarettes: The Extent and Impact of Complementary Dual-
Use”, we offer one of the first studies of the electronic cigarette market from an eco-
nomic perspective. We apply the classic economic notion of complements and sub-
stitutes to electronic and conventional cigarettes. The work examines the validity of
the common assumption that smokers adopt e-cigarettes to reduce (i.e., substitute) their
consumption of traditional cigarettes. We ran an online survey to assess the motivations
of users of both products, referred to as dual-users. The results show 37% of dual-users
regard e-cigarettes primarily as a complement to conventional cigarettes. Using our sur-
vey together results alongside publicly-available US data, we calibrate a cost-benefit
analysis and show that complementary use could wipe out up to 57% of the financial
benefits e-cigarettes offer to society.
3
Price Comparison Websites
1. Introduction
Over the past two decades a new industry of price comparison websites (PCWs) or
‘web aggregators’ has emerged. The industry has enabled consumers to check prices
of many firms selling a particular service or product simultaneously in one place. The
sites are popular in many countries, and in many markets including utilities, financial
services, hotels, flights and durable goods.1 These sites command billions of dollars
of revenue annually.2 In the UK, PCWs for utilities and financial services have been
particularly successful. There are roughly 48 such PCWs in the UK, where over 70%
of internet users have used such a site. The largest four aggregators generated approxi-
mately £800m ($1.2bn) in revenue during 2013, with average annual profit of the group
increasing by 14% that year.3
The internet has altered search costs, allowing consumers to compare prices across
firms in a matter of clicks, intensifying competitive pricing pressure between firms.
While a consumer may not know all the firms in a market, a PCW can expose the
full list of market offerings, maximizing inter-firm pressure. However, underlying this
increased competition are the fees paid by firms who sell their products through the
websites. In the UK these are understood to be between £44-60 ($69-95) for a customer
switching gas and electricity provider.4 These fees, in turn, act as a marginal cost faced
by producers, affecting their pricing decisions.5. The industry gleans substantial profits
1Examples for utilities and services include Moneysupermarket.com, Google Compare and Gocom-
pare.com; for flights Skyscanner.net and Flights.com; for hotels Hotels.com and Booking.com; and for
durable goods Amazon Marketplace, Pricerunner.com and Pricegrabber.com.
2Regarding travel services, Priceline Group (who own Booking.com and Priceline.com) and Expedia
Inc. (who own Expedia.com and Hotels.com) made approximately $6bn in total agency revenues in 2014.
Regarding durable goods, Amazon Marketplace sold 2 billion items from third-party sellers. See their
2014 Annual Reports for details.
3Number of PCWs taken from Consumer Focus (2013) report into PCWs in the UK. The ‘big four’
refers to Money Supermarket, Compare the Market, Go Compare and Confused.com. Number of PCWs
Usage data from the 2013 Mintel Report on Web Aggregators. Financial information taken from the com-
panies’ own annual reports where available, otherwise inferred from parent group reports or newspaper
articles, the details are in the appendix.
4For example, see BBC (2015). Fees are significant in other sectors too e.g., in the hotel-reservation
sector they are reported to be 15-25% of the purchase price (see Daily Mail 2015).
5In practice, PCWs in some markets charge per-click, some per-sale. I abstract from this difference
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from these fees. As such, it is not clear whether the central premise that PCWs lower
prices is valid. This fundamental tension is encapsulated in a quote from the BBC
(2014):
“There’s another cost in the bill. It’s hidden, it’s kept confidential, and
yet it’s for a part of the industry that appears to be on the consumers’ side.
This is the cut of the bill taken by price comparison websites, in return for
referring customers. The recommendation to switch creates churn in the
market, and it is seen by supplier companies as worth paying high fees to
the websites. Whether or not customers choose to use the sites, the cost to
the supplier is embedded within bills for all customers.” 6
This article examines this “churn” and addresses the fundamental question of when
consumers are better off with a PCW in the marketplace. In homogeneous good mar-
kets, I characterize when all consumers are made worse off following the introduction
of PCWs.
My model builds on the elegant framework of Baye and Morgan (2001), who in-
vestigate the strategic incentives of a PCW or ‘information gatekeeper’. Without the
PCW in their model, each consumer is served by a single ‘local’ firm which sells at the
monopoly price (it is too costly for consumers to travel to another store). This leads to
the result that consumers benefit from the introduction of a PCW, because firms must
compete for the business of consumers who enjoy free access to the site. In the modern
online marketplace however, firms also have their own websites.7 In the absence of an
aggregator, consumers do not need to physically travel to purchase the good; they can
visit another firm’s website just as easily as they could an aggregator’s.
My model features two types of consumers: shoppers, who use PCWs in equilib-
rium, and inactive consumers, who buy directly from a particular firm. Although shop-
and model the latter, assuming that the two are correlated.
6The concern was also expressed by US senator Amy Klobuchar regarding mergers of hotel-
reservation sites: “The whole idea of cheaper hotels is very good, but if it all starts to come under
one company, you can easily foresee the situation where they can charge higher commissions that are
then passed on to consumers.” (New York Times, 2015)’
7Often, a PCW simply re-directs users to the selected firm’s own website to complete the purchase.
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pers are always better off than inactive consumers in equilibrium, my primary result is
that both types are always made worse off by the introduction of a single PCW. I then
provide conditions under which consumers are harmed by the introduction of multiple
competing PCWs. This is the first article in this setting to show such results, reversing
those in the existing literature, which I show can be seen as a special limiting case.8
My model supposes each shopper is informed of the prices from q > 1 of the n firms’
websites in the absence of a PCW, rather than q = 1 as in Baye and Morgan. Without a
PCW, shoppers see q prices; after the introduction of the PCW, they will see all of them
in equilibrium. I show that adding competition (q > 1) to the setting without an aggre-
gator reverses their finding: expected equilibrium prices are raised by the introduction
of a single PCW, making all consumers worse off.
What happens is that the equilibrium fee a single PCW charges for a sale through its
site is so high that it more than negates any benefits from the increased firm competition.
One may conjecture that allowing multiple competing aggregators will undo this result,
akin to textbook Bertrand competition. I extend the model to allow for multiple PCWs,
and for shoppers to check any number of them. My characterization shows that both
the number of PCWs and the number of PCWs that shoppers check (or are informed
of), matter. Concretely, when shoppers only check one of many PCWs, they all effec-
tively remain monopolists and so consumer welfare does improve with any number of
PCWs. At the other extreme where shoppers check all PCWs, Bertrand-style reasoning
at the aggregator level results as a special case: PCWs undercut each other’s fees to
reach a unique zero-profit equilibrium and shoppers benefit from their existence. When
shoppers some, but not all PCWs, consumer welfare tends to rise with the number of
PCWs checked, but can fall with the number of PCWs. In particular, in this realistic
case, there is a critical number of PCWs beyond which all consumers can be worse off
than without any aggregators at all.
I then investigate the impact of different policies and other market features. Gener-
ally, PCW fees are either not disclosed or are detailed on a subpage of the websites. I
8This is in the absence of any persuasion or direction of consumers to more expensive products by
firms (e.g., Armstrong and Zhou, 2011), or biased intermediaries (e.g., de Cornie`re and Taylor, 2014).
6
extend the analysis to settings where PCWs publicly announce fees so that consumers
are made aware of them. This creates the possibility that firms and shoppers could coor-
dinate on the cheapest PCW, which can result in equilibria that benefit shoppers relative
to a world without PCWs.
My primary focus is on settings where a firm sets the same price for a product on
every website that it is sold. This assumption describes many markets where PCWs
operate including gas, electricity, mortgages and durable goods. However, I extend
the analysis to consider markets such as the hotel reservation sector, where a firm’s
price can differ across sites. In this case, I show that both types of consumers can be
worse off when shoppers only check one PCW in equilibrium. However, unlike markets
without price discrimination, when shoppers check at least two PCWs, competitive
pressure between aggregators can work a` la Bertrand. I also consider markets where
consumers may face some non-negligible search cost in order to retrieve prices e.g.,
home insurance quotes. Here, the number of shopping consumers is endogenously
determined by the distribution of search costs and the expected savings consumers can
make by using it. I show that despite this activity at the ‘extensive search margin’, an
aggregator can still make all consumers worse off, including those who decide to start
shopping.
Section 2 reviews the literature; Section 3 presents the model; Section 4 conducts
comparative statics with a monopolist PCW; Section 5 models competing aggregators;
Sections 6-8 consider settings with publicly observable fees, price discrimination and
search costs; Section 9 concludes.
2. Literature
This article contributes to the literature on ‘clearing-house’ models, see for exam-
ple (Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; Varian, 1980; Rosenthal, 1980; Baye and Morgan, 2001,
2009; Baye et al., 2004; Chioveanu, 2008; Arnold et al., 2011; Arnold and Zhang,
2014). These models rationalize price-dispersion in homogeneous goods markets.9 In-
9The search cost literature also provides explanations of price dispersion (e.g., Burdett and Judd,
1983; Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012; Stahl, 1989; 1996; Stigler, 1961). Motivated
7
deed, price dispersion has persisted despite the advances of technology such the internet
and comparison sites. Early studies documented marked dispersion in the online mar-
kets for goods (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Baye et al., 2004). A recent study by
Gorodnichenko et al. (2015) finds substantial cross-seller variation in prices, and voices
support for clearing-house models that categorize consumers into loyal and shopping
consumers. The equilibria in my model feature price dispersion regardless of whether
there is an aggregator (or ‘clearing-house’). Without a PCW, this is because there is
some consumer search. Producing price dispersion with a PCW that employs the pric-
ing mechanism seen in practice, is a challenge. The shift in the aggregator industry
away from charging one-off fixed fees, toward pay-per-sale fees to firms is rationalized
as profit-maximizing PCW behavior by Baye et al. (2011). However, without the in-
troduction of some other exogenous fixed cost to a firm of listing on the PCW (e.g.,
transaction costs), price-dispersion vanishes in equilibrium. I do not deny the existence
of such additional costs, but emphasize that dispersion arises in my framework without
appeal to fixed listing costs.
The larger relevant literature is that of two-sided markets, pioneered by Rochet and
Tirole (2003) (see also Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003; Arm-
strong, 2006; Reisinger, 2014). These articles model platforms where buyers and sellers
meet to trade, focusing on platform pricing and the effect of network externalities with
differentiated products and platforms. These models do not explicitly model seller-side
competition, which is central to my model. More recent contributions do (e.g., Belle-
flamme and Peitz, 2010; Hagiu, 2009) but they model the platform as the only available
technology, which is not appropriate for the questions I address. Edelman and Wright
(2015) allow sellers and buyers to conduct business off platform, but they study en-
vironments with differentiated product markets, where the intermediary directly offers
buyer-side benefits such as rebates. In contrast, I model a homogeneous good, isolating
price as the determinant of consumer welfare, where the only benefit a ‘platform’ brings
is informational: it lists available prices. The potential benefit of a PCW to consumers is
by the rise of the internet, clearing-house models abstract from a direct modeling of consumer search
costs. The frameworks are to some extent isomorphic (see Baye et al., 2006).
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that it can lower prices through the interaction of strategic, competing firms, and hence
the size of the benefit is determined endogenously via the equilibrium actions of firms
and consumers.
3. Model
A World Without a PCW
There are n firms and a unit-mass of consumers. Firms produce a homogeneous
product at zero cost without capacity constraints. Consumers wish to buy one unit and
have a common willingness to pay of v > 0. Each consumer is endowed with a ‘de-
fault’, ‘current’ or ‘preferred’ firm from which they are informed of the price. This
assumption has many natural interpretations. In the market for services and utilities
(e.g., gas and electricity tariffs, mortgages, credit cards, broadband, cellphone con-
tracts, car, home and travel insurance etc.) consumers can be thought of as having a
current provider for the service for which they know the price they pay and the renewal
price should they remain with the same provider.10 In the market for flights, hotels or
durable goods, consumers can be thought to have a carrier, hotel (or hotel chain) or pro-
ducer which they prefer, perhaps bookmarked in their browser or for which they receive
marketing emails that directly inform them of the price or prompt the user to find out
via hyperlinks, in a matter of seconds.
A proportion α ∈ (0, 1) of consumers are ‘shoppers’. Casual empiricism suggests
that many people enjoy browsing or looking for a bargain. Shoppers check (are aware
of) at least one rival firm’s website and therefore know q > 1 of the n prices. A
shopper sticks with his or her default firm if its price is not beaten by another price.
If a rival firm’s price is cheaper, the shopper switches. The remaining proportion of
1 − α consumers are ‘auto-renewing’, ‘loyal’, ‘offline’ or ‘inactive’ consumers who
do not shop around. In markets where firms are service providers, such consumers
simply allow their contract with their existing provider to continue with their default
firm. Much of the furore surrounding PCWs has been directed at those operating in the
10Providers usually provide renewal price information directly to consumers.
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services and utilities sectors. In the presentation that follows I adopt terminology suited
to that sector, of ‘current’ firms or providers with consumers referred to as ‘shoppers’
and ‘auto-renewers’.
I assume that each firm has an equal share of current consumers of each type (α
n
shoppers and 1−α
n
auto-renewers). Firms set prices and shoppers simultaneously decide
which rival-firm websites to visit. I focus on equilibria in which firms adopt identical
pricing strategies and shoppers employ symmetric shopping strategies. Going forward
I refer to such symmetric equilibria simply as equilibria.
This setup generalizes Varian (1980), nesting his equilibrium.11 He motivates the
two types as being completely ‘informed’ about all n prices, or ‘uninformed’. The in-
formed buy the cheapest on the market, while the uninformed buy from their default
firm. In my model, shoppers see q prices where 1 < q ≤ n and I derive the unique equi-
librium. When q = n, Varian’s equilibrium corresponds to that derived in Proposition 1
below.
Shoppers can be characterized by
(
n
q
)
groups. Each group is a list of the firms
checked by that consumer. For example, consider q = 2, n = 4 with firms indexed
1,2,3,4. Then there are 6 possible comparisons shoppers could make: {12, 13,14, 23,
24, 34}, where the two digits refer to which firms’ prices are checked. Each firm is
involved in
(
n−1
q−1
)
= 3 price comparisons. Shoppers employ symmetric shopping strate-
gies, and hence are evenly distributed across these groups: 1
6
compare the prices of
firms 1 and 2, 1
6
compare firms 1 and 3, and so on. Equivalently, one could interpret a
consumer as randomizing uniformly over which rival-firm websites she or he checks.12
Now consider the best-response of firms. Without loss of generality, let F : p →
[0, 1] denote the cumulative distribution function of prices charged by firms in equilib-
rium. Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium without a PCW.
Proposition 1. In the unique equilibrium firms mix according to the distribution
11The only differences being that I assume zero costs and do not employ his zero-profit condition.
12Note that although I focus on a symmetric distribution across these pairs, this shopper behavior
is not an assumption per se; it is a best response in equilibrium to symmetric firm behavior because
consumers are then indifferent to which firm they check.
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F (p) = 1−
[
(v − p)(1− α)
qpα
] 1
q−1
over the support p ∈
[
v(1− α)
1 + α(q − 1) , v
]
.
Price dispersion is a central feature in clearing-house models and showcases how
they rationalize price dispersion in homogeneous goods markets. The limited-search
assumption does not alter the intuition for why. Bertrand-style reasoning of undercut-
ting down to the marginal cost (here normalized to 0) does not play out. Because of the
existence of auto-renewers, firms can guarantee themselves profit of at least v(1−α)
n
> 0.
Therefore, any point mass existing in equilibrium strategies must be for some p˙ > 0.
Any such mass would always be undercut by firms to gain a discrete number of shoppers
for an arbitrary -loss in price.
Models building on Varian’s assume that in a world without a clearing-house, con-
sumers cannot check other prices, so the pure monopolistic-price equilibrium of p = v
results. As in Stahl (1989), if there were no shoppers in my model, I would obtain such
a Diamond (1971) equilibrium with each firm charging v; and if there were only shop-
pers, then the Bertrand outcome of p = 0 would result. Unlike Stahl, shoppers do not
necessarily know the prices of all firms, but they know at least two. Proposition 1 shows
that with some (but non-zero) search, price dispersion still emerges in equilibrium.
It is also instructive to note that equilibrium pricing does not vary with the number
of firms, n, as long as q < n. Each shopper compares q prices, regardless of the total
number of firms. When making pricing decisions, a firm is not concerned about the
number of other firms per se, but rather about the other prices shoppers know. As all
firms price symmetrically and independently in equilibrium, it is as if each firm only
faces q − 1 rivals. In other words, what matters is the number of comparisons shoppers
make, not the number of firms in the market.
A World With a PCW
Suppose an entrepreneur creates a price comparison website. I add a preliminary
stage to the game at which the PCW sets a ‘click-through fee’ c ∈ R+ that a firm must
pay to the aggregator per sale made via the site. Consumers do not learn c, although
11
they will have correct expectations in equilibrium.13 Each firm sees the fee c and must
choose a price, and whether or not to post it on the PCW.
Models with a clearing-house that does not charge a fixed fee typically have many
equilibria, see for instance Baye et al. (1992) for their characterization of the full set of
equilibria of Varian (1980). Throughout the paper, I focus on symmetric equilibria in
which shoppers only check PCWs.14 With a monopoly PCW, this results in a unique
equilibrium that one can explicitly solve for. In the equilibrium, firms list on the PCW
with probability one and prices are dispersed, so shoppers have a strict incentive to
check the PCW.15
To find the equilibrium, I use the following lemma which takes c as fixed and charac-
terizes the ensuing mutual best-responses of firms. Define G(p; c) to be the cumulative
distribution function of prices charged by firms for a given click through fee c:
G(p; c) = 1−
[
(v − p) (1− α)
α(np− (n− 1)c)
] 1
n−1
Lemma 1. The mutual best-responses of firms as a function of c:
1. If c ∈ [0, v(1 − α)), firm responses have no point masses, and are described by
G(p; c).
2. If c = v(1−α), there are two classes of response, one with no point masses described
by G(p, c), and those that are degenerate.
3. If c ∈ (v(1− α), v], firm responses are degenerate.
Where pricing is described by G(p; c) each firm always lists its price on the PCW.
When c is in the lower interval described by Lemma 1, firms undercut each other
until the point at which they would be better off charging the maximum price v and only
13As the BBC quote in the Introduction notes, the exact fee is “kept confidential”, not publicly an-
nounced.
14Recall this is in addition to knowing their current or preferred firm’s price, which upon sale, con-
tinues to count as a direct purchase e.g., the auto-renewal letter, the bookmarked airline or the hotel’s
marketing email.
15Note more generally that there exist other equilibria e.g., trivial equilibria in which no firms or
shoppers attend the PCW. The set-up is then identical to that of the previous section and the equilibrium
is given by Proposition 1 with the vacuous addition that the PCW can charge any c. There also exist
asymmetric equilibria where not all firms list on the PCW (see Footnote 16).
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selling to their auto-renewers. However, if c exceeds v(1 − α), undercutting does not
reach this point, so no firm would jump to v. Rather, it reaches a point where all firms
charge the same price, selling to all their consumers directly, where no firm undercuts
further or jumps to v. The reason no further undercutting occurs is that doing so would
mean charging a price p < c that would win all rival firms’ shoppers, but would do so at
a loss. The reason no firm jumps to v is that they are making more in this pure-pricing
equilibrium where they sell to all their consumers directly. If c = v(1 − α) then both
mixed and pure equilibria obtain as threshold cases.
To derive the equilibrium, consider now incentives of the PCW. The PCW will make
zero profit if firms all charge the same price, as then no shoppers switch, but positive
profit in any mixing equilibrium if c > 0. The PCW therefore has a strong incentive to
induce price dispersion because shoppers switch when they can obtain a strictly lower
price with a new firm. A feature of distributions with no point masses is that the proba-
bility of a tie in price is zero. As a result, shoppers at n − 1 of the n firms will switch.
Given that firms mix in this way, the PCW will raise c as high as possible before re-
version to a pure equilibrium, which here happens for c > v (1− α). Proposition 2
characterizes the equilibrium.16
Proposition 2. In the unique equilibrium where shoppers check the PCW, the PCW
sets a click-through fee of c = v (1− α), firms list on the PCW and mix over prices
according to G(p; v(1− α)) over the support p ∈ [v(1− α), v].
That only pure equilibria exist for c > v(1 − α) is what limits the PCW fee and
allows there to be price dispersion at equilibrium without fixed costs for firms. It is the
outside option of current shoppers for firms that limits the fee that the PCW charges.
Shoppers know their current provider’s price regardless of where they check prices and
stay with their current firm if there are no lower prices to be found on the PCW. Hence,
16 Note that in the symmetric equilibrium, all firms list on the PCW. In practice however, some firms
do not always list on PCWs. Note that here there exist asymmetric equilibria where m ≥ 2 firms list on
the PCW, mixing over prices [v(1 − α), v] in a similar way to the CDF of Proposition 2, with the other
n −m firms not listing, charging v and selling only to their auto-renewers with all shoppers uniformly
spread over the mixing firms. The price-rising result of this article also holds in any of these asymmetric
equilibria.
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a firm can always guarantee itself its own shoppers and avoid the aggregator’s fee by
charging a price low enough to undercut the market and not list on the PCW. It is this
threat that discourages the PCW from charging fees that are even higher in equilibrium.
If firms did not have this outside option, the PCW could raise its fee to c = v, firms
would charge p = v, price dispersion would be lost and the PCW would be able to
extract all the surplus.
4. Comparative Statics
Comparing the equilibria of Propositions 1 and 2 reveals how the PCW affects con-
sumer welfare.
Proposition 3. Both types of consumer are worse off with the PCW than without.
The proof of Proposition 3 shows that the expected shopper-price under F is less
than the lower bound of the support of G (see Figure 1). It immediately follows that
shoppers expect to pay more under G, as the expected lowest price is higher. That G
first-order stochastic dominates F shows that auto-renewers expect to pay more under
G, as the expected price is higher.
With the introduction of a PCW, the two effects stated in Corollaries 1 and 2 give
rise to Proposition 3:
Corollary 1. Within the mixed-price equilibrium firm responses of Lemma 1, as c ∈
[0, v(1− α)] increases, the expected price paid by both types of consumer increases.
Corollary 2. As the number of firms increases, the expected price paid by shoppers
decreases, but the expected price paid by auto-renewers increases.
Corollary 1 shows that when the PCW sets a higher fee, the expected price paid
by both shoppers and auto-renewers rise. The fee is passed on by firms to consumers
through a first-order stochastic shift in the prices set in equilibrium. Upon winning, a
firm must pay the PCW for all of the (n−1
n
) shoppers who purchase through the site.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium price distributions calibrated with q = 2, v = 1, α = .7
0 1
0
1
F (p) G(p; v(1− α)) for n = 2, 3, 5, 10, 50
p
EF [p(1,2)]
Because the amount paid rises with the fee, the price charged in equilibrium also rises
with the fee.
The second effect is that the PCW increases competitive pressure among firms to
fight for all n− 1 rival firms’ shoppers. In contrast, without the PCW, firms effectively
competed against only q − 1 rivals. Different models in the clearing house literature
offer different predictions about the effect of n on equilibrium prices. Some derive
distributions for which an increase in n raises prices for both types of consumer (e.g.,
Rosenthal, 1980); while in other models it lowers prices for shoppers and raises prices
for captive consumers (e.g., Varian, 1980; Morgan et al., 2006).17 My model belongs
to this second category. An increase in n has two effects on equilibrium prices. First,
increased competition pushes probability mass to the high-price extreme of the distribu-
tion, as Figure 1 shows. This results in a first-order stochastic ordering in n, so expected
price increases in n and auto-renewers pay more. Second, shoppers now pay the lowest
of n + 1 prices rather than n, which reduces the expected lowest price. Corollary 2
shows that this second effect more than offsets the first, implying that shoppers pay less
17Also see Baye et al. (2006) for a discussion on this point and a wider review of clearing-house
models.
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in expectation when there are more firms.18
In order to relate these two effects of a PCW to Proposition 3, I make the following
remark.
Remark 1. If q = n, G(p; 0) = F (p)
The entrance of a PCW increases both the fee firms pay (from 0 to v(1 − α)) and
the number of prices that shoppers compare (from q to n). The first effect raises the
expected price auto-renewers pay, which is compounded further by n > q, so they are
unambiguously worse off with a PCW. The effects pull shopper welfare in opposite di-
rections, but Proposition 3 shows that no matter how large n is, it fails to undo the effect
of the optimally chosen PCW fee c. Hence, shoppers are also worse off in expectation
with a PCW.
Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, welfare necessarily sums to v in equi-
librium. As firms make the same expected profit in both worlds, there is a one-to-one
relation between the decrease in consumer welfare and the profits of the PCW. That the
PCW does not reduce firm profits comes from the fact that (with or without the PCW)
firms have (1−α
n
) auto-renewers. Firms can therefore guarantee themselves v
(
1−α
n
)
in
both worlds. Although this article focuses on consumer rather than producer welfare, it
is important to point out that the incentives of the PCW and firms are not aligned. This
is because there is exactly one cheapest price and hence α
(
n−1
n
)
shoppers who switch
from non-cheapest prices, which increases with n. An increase in n however, would
of course, squeeze per firm profit. Therefore, a PCW would always encourage market
entry if it could.
One channel through which all consumers would gain is by more auto-renewers
becoming shoppers:19
18Although the result of Corollary 2 is common to clearing-house models, it may seem a rather nu-
anced prediction of equilibrium pricing. Morgan et al. (2006) conduct an experiment with participants
playing the role of firms against computerized buyers and found that when n was increased, prices paid
by inelastic consumers indeed increased whereas those paid by shoppers decreased.
19This is a prediction common to clearing-house models, for which Morgan et al. (2006) find experi-
mental support.
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Corollary 3. When pricing is determined by G(p; c), as the proportion of shoppers α
increases, expected prices for both types of consumer decrease.
One may conjecture that a PCW would want to maximize α (the number of shop-
pers) in order to obtain more referral fees. However, this logic is incomplete. Expand-
ing the PCWs action set to include the determination of α (one can think of the PCW
determining α through advertising) yields the following result:20
Corollary 4. If the PCW can determine α as well as c in the preliminary stage, then the
PCW sets α = 1
2
.
PCW revenue is hump-shaped in profit. As α → 0 it receives less and less traffic,
and hence vanishing revenue. As α → 1, firms have fewer auto-renewers to exploit,
which pushes v(1 − α), the maximum fee for which firms are willing to mix, to zero.
Indeed, when α = 1 all consumers are shoppers and the PCW removes any incentive
for firms to increase prices as there are no auto-renewers to exploit. This leads any
equilibrium to have all firms charging the same price, and such pure-strategy equilibria
leave the PCW with zero profit. So even if the PCW could bring all consumers online,
it has a strict incentive to ensure an interior solution for α.
5. Competing Aggregators
Suppose that there are now K > 1 PCWs indexed k = 1, ..., K which move simul-
taneously in the first period each setting a fee ck. Here I show that allowing competition
between PCWs is not meaningful, per se. A crucial measure of competitive pressure is
the number of aggregators shoppers check, r, where 1 ≤ r ≤ K. In the setting without
PCWs, shoppers know the prices of q ≤ n firms. In the world with PCWs, one can in-
terpret r ≤ K as the number of aggregators that shoppers are aware of. In the equilibria
derived, firms list on all PCWs so shoppers are indifferent to which set of PCWs they
check. However, PCW fees and firm-pricing strategies depend on r. Hence there are
20α is determined costlessly for the PCW. If this advertising costs were a convex function of α, it
would not change the results qualitatively.
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different sets of equilibria for each r. This leads me to index equilibria by r. I first look
at the case of r = 1, where shoppers check just one of the PCWs.
Proposition 4. With K > 1 competing PCWs, if shoppers check r = 1 PCW then both
types of consumer are worse off with the PCWs than without.
Proposition 4 obtains because the high-fee, single-PCW equilibrium of Proposi-
tion 2 with c = v(1− α) remains the unique equilibrium fee.21 Introducing competing
PCWs exerts no downward pressure on fees. There are no equilibria at lower fee levels
because shoppers only check one PCW, which means there is no incentive for PCWs
to undercut each other’s fees. If they did, they would not increase their volume of
sales, but they would receive lower fees. In contrast, for any candidate equilibrium with
c < v(1 − α), there is an incentive to raise the fee because PCWs can maintain the
volume of sales and earn a higher fee.
In the simplest textbook Bertrand result, there is an immediate fall in the equilibrium
price between that of a monopoly firm and the marginal-cost pricing of two firms. At
the aggregator level however, one can see that this logic is incomplete as Proposition 4
shows, with K > 1 such undercutting does not even necessarily begin. The persistence
of the consumer-welfare-decreasing equilibrium in Proposition 4 is an artefact of each
shopper only checking one PCW which effectively makes each PCW a monopoly. Be-
cause all PCWs offer the same information, shoppers have no incentive to check other
PCWs. In this respect, the equilibrium is reminiscent of Diamond (1971), but at the
aggregation not the firm level. One might think that the Bertrand remedy for shoppers
would be to require them to check at least two PCWs, causing PCWs to undercut each
other until an equilibrium with all PCWs charging c = 0 is reached. I now explain how
this logic is incomplete. Suppose that the model is as before with K > 1 aggregators,
but shoppers now check r > 1 PCWs. First, I examine the special case of r = K > 1:
Proposition 5. With K > 1 competing PCWs, shoppers are guaranteed to be better off
than before the introduction of PCWs if and only if they check all PCWs: The unique
21As in the monopolist case, firms’ outside option gives rise to pure-pricing firm responses at higher
fee levels, which bounds equilibrium fee levels from above at c = v(1−α); see the Appendix for details.
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equilibrium PCW fee-level is c = 0 if and only if r = K > 1.
The spirit of this result resembles that of Bertrand. To see why there cannot be
some other equilibrium with c > 0, suppose so and consider an undercutting deviation
by PCW1 to some cˆ1 = c−. Shoppers do not detect the deviation and so do not change
their behavior. As for firms, notice that for any p they strictly prefer to list exclusively
on PCW1: When a firm is the cheapest, it will sell to all shoppers so long as it lists on
some PCW. This is precisely because r = K. Hence by listing on PCW1 only, there is
no reduction in the number of shoppers switching to them when they are cheapest, but
there is a reduction in the fee the firm pays as cˆ1 < c. The PCW finds this deviation
strictly profitable because it receives a discrete gain in the number of shoppers switching
through it, for an arbitrarily small loss in price.
Where shoppers check more than one PCW, but not necessarily all PCWs, we have:
Lemma 2. When K > r > 1, there exists an equilibrium in which PCWs charge c¯ > 0,
firms list on all PCWs, mixing over prices by G(p; c¯) where
c¯ =
v(1− α)Kr(K − r)
K(1 + r(K − 2)) + αr(K − 1)(r − 1)(n− 1) .
More generally, there exist equilibria in which PCWs charge c ∈ [0, c¯]. To under-
stand how much consumer welfare can be reduced, I discuss the highest-fee equilibrium
from this set. Because PCWs have a strong incentive to coordinate on this equilibrium,
it may be especially relevant in practice.
Notice that substituting r = K in Lemma 2 yields c¯ = 0, and one obtains Propo-
sition 5. One can see now that the Bertrand-style reasoning underlying Proposition 5
was a special case. To see why the principle does not apply more generally, consider
a fee level c > 0 and an undercutting deviation by PCW1 to some c1 = c −  > 0.
Unlike when K = r > 1, when K > r > 1 it is not necessarily better for a firm to
only list on the cheaper PCW1. By listing a price exclusively on PCW1, there are now
K−r
K
> 0 shoppers who do not see the firm’s price, and so will not buy from it even if
it is the cheapest. Firms now face a trade-off: Exclusively listing on PCW1 means that
any sales incur only the lower fee cˆ1 upon a sale, but there will be a reduction in sales
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volume because not all shoppers check PCW1. Which force is stronger in this trade-off
depends on the size of the undercut . If PCW1 undercuts by enough, firms will deviate
to exclusively list on PCW1, breaking the symmetric equilibrium. Unlike the simpler
logic of Proposition 5, it is no longer true that any  > 0 undercut will attract firms to
exclusively list on the cheapest PCW. Hence, PCWs do not always have an incentive to
undercut each other and higher-price equilibria are sustained.
I now discuss how the set of equilibria varies with how many PCWs shoppers check
(r) and the number of aggregators (K). Firstly, c¯ is limited by a higher r: dc¯
dr
< 0.
That is, as shoppers check more PCWs in equilibrium, the incentive for a PCW to
undercut the fees of other PCWs increases so that only lower fee-levels can be sustained
in equilibrium.
However, as the number of aggregators increases, the incentive is reversed. The
number of shoppers checking a given PCW ( r
K
) falls. Accordingly, in equilibrium each
firm receives less of its expected revenue from any single PCW. It then requires a more
severe undercut from a PCW to get firms to exclusively list on it and forgo the business
available from the other aggregators. For undercuts that are too severe, it is unprofitable
for a PCW to deviate, even if it were to win exclusive arrangements with all firms as a
result. Thus, as K increases, higher equilibrium fees can be sustained in equilibrium:
dc¯
dK
> 0. This allows for the result that a higher number of aggregators can lead to
higher fees, and hence higher prices. Furthermore:
Proposition 6. For any r, there exists a K˜ such that as long as there are more than
K˜ aggregators both types of consumer can be worse off than before the introduction of
any PCWs.
In the limit, the proportion of firm income that comes from sales on any one ag-
gregator becomes vanishingly small. As this happens, c¯ → v(1 − α) i.e., sustainable
equilibrium fee levels approach the monopoly-PCW level, again making both types of
consumer worse off than before the introduction of the sites.
20
6. Publicly-Observable Fees
One reason that competing aggregators do not drive fees to zero is that shoppers do
not detect changes in the fees of PCWs in equilibrium. This precludes a coordinated
response between firms and shoppers that could punish a PCW that charges higher fees.
If fees were publicly announced so that shoppers were aware of them, then credible
subgame equilibria could follow the fee-setting decision in which the PCW charging
the lowest fee is attended by all firms and shoppers. Any higher-fee equilibrium would
then be undercut until c = 0, leading to lower shopper-prices. Indeed:
Proposition 7. When K > 1 and PCW fees are observed by shoppers, there exists an
equilibrium with c = 0.
There are multiple equilibria because there are many subgame equilibria that can
follow each value of the vector of PCW fees, including somewhat unintuitive ones
where coordination occurs at more expensive PCWs.22 If one adopts the plausible
refinement that firms and consumers only patronize the lowest-fee PCWs, then one
obtains the zero-fee equilibrium as the unique equilibrium.
However, even with sufficient refinement criteria to implement the zero-fee equi-
librium, in some markets one may question a policy of fee-announcements on a more
fundamental level. If fees can be publicly announced, then surely so can firm prices,
which would extinguish the role of a PCW in the first place.
In reality, PCW fees are not publicized directly. However, some PCWs do adver-
tise summary statistics of the price information of firms that list on them. PCWs fre-
quently advertise the average savings a consumer using their site is expected to make,
which could direct shoppers to the cheapest PCW. By Proposition 7, this could lead
to a shopper-welfare-improving equilibrium. However, many PCWs do not advertise
based on purchase-relevant information.23 PCWs spend large sums on such advertising,
which has been shown to correlate with the number of unique visitors they experience,
22Proposition 7 excludes the monopoly-PCW case (K = 1), where the unique equilibrium is still that
of Proposition 2 because of course no coordination between firms and consumers over which PCW to
attend is possible when there is only one PCW.
23See the campaign of Comparethemarket.com, based on a story about meerkats.
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suggesting that many shoppers are directed to PCWs based on information other than
price.24 If such ‘persuasive’ advertising caused all shoppers to loyally visit one site
each i.e., r = 1, Proposition 2 applies and both types of consumers would still have
been better off without the PCW industry.
7. Price Discrimination
So far, I have considered the impact of web services that list or ‘aggregate’ the avail-
able information (prices) charged by firms offering a product or service. In practice, this
is often the case in the markets for gas, electricity, financial products such as mortgages,
and durable goods.25 However, in other markets, a firm may set a price p0 for a direct
purchase, and pk different prices for each PCWk that it lists on. Where a PCW operates
by referring shoppers back to a firm’s website to complete the purchase, the fact that
the click came from a PCW is recognized by the firm’s site, which then offers the price
seen on the PCW that attracted the click. When K ≥ r = 1, we have:
Proposition 8. With price discrimination, if r = 1, there exists an equilibrium in which
PCWs set c = v(1−α), firms list on all PCWs, p0 = v and p1 = · · · = pK = v(1−α).
The ability of firms to price discriminate does not prevent PCWs from setting fees
at the same high level as in Proposition 4 because r = 1. Thus, as before, there is effec-
tively no competitive pressure between PCWs. However, price discrimination does lead
to firms listing a common price on PCWs in equilibrium because PCWs no longer have
an incentive to keep prices posted on it dispersed. This is because firms can set a high
direct purchase price p0 = v and a lower price through the PCWs. Given this, shop-
pers always purchase through a PCW. Because all α shoppers now purchase through
PCWs, rather than in the case without discrimination, where only α
(
n−1
n
)
did so, total
PCW profit is now αv(1−α) rather than (n−1
n
)
αv(1−α). As firm profit is unaffected,
it follows then that relative to the case without price discrimination, total consumer
24The big four PCWs in the UK spent approximately £110m in 2010 on advertising. The evidence
here is from Nielsen Company (findings reported by the This is Money 2015 and Marketing Magazine
2011).
25In the example of the UK gas and electricity markets, regulation has enforced that each energy
company may only offer a maximum of four tariffs in total.
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welfare falls. There are, however, opposing effects on shoppers and auto-renewers.
Auto-renewers are worse off, as now firms charge them the monopoly price v. Shopper
welfare though improves as they now face pk = v(1− α) for sure, whereas before this
was just the minimum of the support of equilibrium prices. More importantly, shopper
welfare does not improve sufficiently to overturn Proposition 3, which continues to hold
for this equilibrium, leaving both types are worse off than in a world with no PCWs.
The ability of firms to discriminate allows them to fully extract surplus from their cap-
tive auto-renewers; but PCWs can now extract the revenue from sales to all shoppers
through their sites.26
In equilibria with r > 1, the incentive for aggregators to undercut is present. Corol-
lary 5 describes a best response of firms following a unilateral downward deviation by
a PCW1 from a symmetric fee level.
Corollary 5. When firms price discriminate, following c1 ∈ (0, c2) and c2 = c3 =
, . . . ,= cK ≡ c ∈ (0, v(1−α)] there exist mutual best-responses of firms such that they
list on all PCWs, setting p0 = v and pk = · · · = ck for all k.
When r = 1, there is no incentive for a PCW to make such an undercutting deviation
as suggested by the equilibrium described in Proposition 8. When r > 1 however,
PCWs have this incentive to undercut because they can enjoy a discrete gain in fee
revenue from the r−1
K
of shoppers who were checking their PCW but buying though
another site in the symmetric equilibrium. When firms can price discriminate across
websites, firms can compete in prices on PCW1 without changing their prices on other
PCWs. This shows how price discrimination can unleash undercutting at the PCW
level whenever consumers check r > 1 PCWs, which can in turn lead to zero-fee
equilibria.27 This contrasts with markets where PCWs aggregate price-information,
where Proposition 5 showed that this undercutting was only fully unlocked when r =
K.
26As before, in the equilibrium of Proposition 8, PCWs cannot raise fees further, to say c′ > v(1−α)
because of firms’ outside option. Following such a unilateral PCW deviation, firms would set p0 =
v(1− α) so that their shoppers purchase directly from them, reducing PCW profit to zero.
27The existence of zero-fee equilibria when r > 1 are shown in the Appendix.
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Aggregation and Discrimination in Large Markets
In the setting with a PCW and price discrimination, the equilibrium of Proposition 8
shows the price paid by the two types are as maximally separated: Shopper price is
competed down to firms’ marginal cost c, and auto-renewer price is v. In the setting with
an aggregator and no price discrimination, the equilibrium is given by Proposition 2
where Corollary 2 explains that as the number of firms increases, the expected prices
paid by shoppers and that paid by auto-renewers, diverge. This occurs because as the
number of firms increases, so does the competitive pressure on pricing to win shoppers.
As a result, more probability mass is placed on lower prices. Firms compensate for
this by also increasing the mass placed on higher prices, increasing their expected profit
from auto-renewers. In fact, for arbitrarily large markets (where n → ∞), I show that
these two settings are equivalent.
Proposition 9. For n → ∞, following the introduction of a PCW, the expected prices
faced by both types of consumer in the setting without price discrimination (Proposi-
tion 2) are the same as in the setting with price discrimination (Proposition 8).
The result highlights the connection between the two market structures. Indeed, I
found that both types of consumer can be worse off with a PCW with or without the
possibility price discrimination. I emphasize therefore that the key difference between
the settings lies in their predictions under competition at the aggregator level.
8. The Extensive Search Margin
This paper utilizes a clearing-house framework, where auto-renewers are inactive
and can also be interpreted as being offline, loyal, uninformed or as having high search
costs. Here, I focus on a search-cost rationalization, better applied to markets where
obtaining a quote requires more information from the consumer e.g., home insurance.
In an environment without a PCW where auto-renewers find it too costly to enter these
details into a firm’s website to retrieve one extra price, the introduction of a PCW of-
fers to expose all prices to them, for the same search cost. Depending on their search
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cost, the introduction of a PCW may then cause an auto-renewer to engage with the
market via the PCW. Some empirical studies have offered a similar argument to explain
observed increases in market competitiveness (e.g., Brown and Goolsbee, 2002; Byrne
et al., 2014). Their arguments are distinct from mine because they contrast a world with
web-based aggregators relative to a world without the Internet, rather than a world with
the Internet and firm websites. This engagement of new customers is commonly re-
ferred to as the ‘extensive search margin’ (for a recent discussion see Moraga-Gonza´lez
et al., 2015).
The benefit of an additional search for a consumer in the world without a PCW is
the difference between the expected price and the expected lowest of two prices drawn
(from F ). In the world with a PCW, the benefit of a search on the PCW is the difference
between the expected price and the expected lowest of n draws (from G).28 I denote
these search benefits without and with an aggregator respectively as,
B0 = EF [p]− EF [p(1,2)], B1 = EG[p]− EG[p(1,n)].
The model is as before but now each auto-renewer faces a search cost s. I assume
these costs are heterogeneous, distributed by S over s ∈ [
¯
s,∞).29 I assume
¯
s > B0
which means that without a PCW, no auto-renewers shop, preserving the equilibrium
of Proposition 1. After the introduction of a PCW, the benefit of a search (B1) may
outweigh the cost (s) for some auto-renewers, who then choose to use the site. I use the
term ‘converts’ and ‘non-converts’ to distinguish between auto-renewers who decide to
shop or not in equilibrium.
The total number of consumers using the PCW (shoppers and converts) is endoge-
nously determined in equilibrium and is denoted α˜ = α + (1 − α)S(B1). Given α˜,
the PCW sets its profit-maximizing fee c = v(1 − α˜). As c and α˜ are exogenous to
firms, equilibrium pricing is as in Proposition 2 with α˜ replacing α. In turn, pricing
determines B1. There is an equilibrium when this value of α˜ satisfies S(B1) = α˜−α1−α .
28These terms are analogous to the ‘value of information’ in Varian (1980).
29That there is no upper bound ensures that there are always some auto-renewers, and hence price
dispersion, in equilibrium.
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When there exists such an S, α˜ is said to be ‘rationalized’.
Corollary 3 showed that a higher α increases the welfare of all consumers. Corol-
lary 1 showed that a lower c has the same effect. As the equilibrium fee level is v(1−α˜),
both forces work to benefit all types of consumer. However, whether consumers actually
gain depends on how many auto-renewers are converted. In fact, relative to the world
without a PCW, the presence of converts is not sufficient to guarantee lower prices for
any consumer, not even converts themselves:
Proposition 10. Shoppers, converts and non-converts can all be worse off with a PCW
than without.
The proof gives an example of such an equilibrium, along with a distribution S that
rationalizes it. More generally, there can be many equilibria, each with a different α˜. If
the benefit (B1) is small or there are no types with low search costs so that S(B1) = 0,
there are no converts (α˜ = α) and the equilibrium of Proposition 2 applies. Proposi-
tion 10 shows that when some auto-renewers convert, all consumers can be worse off
with a PCW. However, there may also exist equilibria where α˜ is high enough such that
some consumers benefit. Whether these equilibria exist depends on the distribution of
search costs S. For a given PCW search benefit B1, when more auto-renewers have low
search costs (higher S(B1)), α˜ is higher, c is lower and total consumer welfare is higher.
The number of firms also determines the size of the benefit the PCW offers (B1),
and hence the number of converts. I now investigate which consumers benefit from
an aggregator when the potential benefit it offers to consumers (B1 − B0) is as large
as possible. For a given α˜, a higher number of firms increases the equilibrium search
benefit B1 (see Corollary 2). Specifically, as n→∞, B1 → v − c (see Proposition 9),
which is as large as possible. To maximize B1 − B0 I let q = 2 in the world without
a PCW, which makes B0 as low as possible, as B0 is increasing in q.30 Accordingly, I
define,
Definition. A market has ‘maximum potential’ when q = 2 and n→∞.
30See the end of the proof of Proposition 5.
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Proposition 11. If the market has maximum potential: converts are better off; shoppers
can be worse off; and non-converts are worse off with a PCW than without.
When the market has maximum potential, converts are guaranteed to be better off
but shoppers still may not be.31 This is because there still may not be enough auto-
renewers converting to PCW use.
9. Conclusion
The analysis shows that the introduction of PCWs may not in fact benefit consumers
by reducing expected prices. The introduction of a single aggregator facilitates compar-
ison of the whole marketplace for shoppers, which exerts competitive pressure on firm
pricing. However, the aggregator charges a fee which, in turn, places upward pressure
on prices. The net effect is that prices increase for all consumers, who would be better
off without the site.
Competition at the aggregator level need not lead to a reduction in fees. There
are many equilibria, which I parameterize by the number of PCWs shoppers check,
or are informed of. If shoppers only check one PCW each, consumers are no better
off than in the monopoly setting. A greater number of aggregators is only guaranteed
benefit shoppers if they check all of them. If shoppers check an intermediate number,
increasing the number of aggregators can lead to higher prices; for a sufficiently high
number, all consumers can again be better off without the industry. Hence, when there
are many aggregators in the market, how many of them shoppers check is a crucial
variable. As a result, regulatory bodies may wish to consider incentivizing consumers to
check more, alongside stronger actions such as limiting the fees charged by aggregators
and limiting the number of PCWs in the market.
If competing PCWs publicly announce fees, this can result in low-fee equilibria, but
it relies on coordination between firms and shoppers. In markets with price discrimi-
nation, if shoppers only check one PCW, the monopoly fee level can still be sustained,
31By Proposition 9, one can also use Proposition 11 to consider the effect of introducing a PCW into
a market with search costs and price discrimination under the equilibrium of Proposition 8.
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making consumers worse off. However, with competing aggregators where shoppers
check multiple PCWs, there is then the incentive for the sites to undercut each other’s
fees. As such, regulators may also wish to consider whether it is possible to introduce
price discrimination into markets in which it is not currently present. In online markets
with non-negligible search costs, even those consumers who rationally start engaging
in price comparison may be worse off following the introduction of a PCW. Helpful
policies would help erode these costs where possible and encourage more inactive con-
sumers to engage in comparison.
Appendix
A1. Summary Statistics of UK PCW Industry
The figures quoted for turnover and profit in the introduction for the UK utilities
and services industry are estimates for 2013 for the largest four such companies. The
estimate for each site was taken from the following sources:
• Money Supermarket: Their own 2013 annual report.
• Confused: The Admiral Group’s Annual Reports 2012 and 2013.
• Go Compare: Newspaper ‘The Guardian’ 2014 article.
• Compare the Market: Parent BGL Group’s Annual Report 2013 and BBC article
2015.
For the first three, the figures were taken directly from the cited sources. For Compare
the Market, estimated to be the largest of the four sites, the estimate is particularly rough
as BGL Group offer no breakdown of their accounts. I assumed that the proportion of
BGL’s total revenue and profit due to Compare the Market was the same where the
estimate for annual profit due to Compare the Market is taken from the BBC article.
Even if the estimated £800m of total turnover and 14% for average annual profit growth
for these sites is off by a margin, the industry can still be considered large and growing.
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A2. A World Without a PCW
The domain of prices isR. The equilibrium pricing strategy can always be described
by its CDF (denoted F in this section, and with other letters later on). In what follows,
either equilibrium pricing distributions will be pure (so that F is flat, with one jump
discontinuity at this price); or will have no point masses so that F is continuous, which
implies the density f exists and f = F ′, wherever F ′ exists.
Lemma A1. In equilibrium, there are no prices p s.t. p ≤ 0 or p > v.
Proof: Any p ≤ 0 generates firm profits pi(p) ≤ 0 which is dominated by p = v which
gives profit of at least v (1−α)
n
> 0 because firms always sell to their auto-renewers. For
p > v, pi(p) = 0 because no one will buy at such a high price, hence again p = v
dominates.
Lemma A2. There are no point masses in equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma A2: This is a variation of Proposition 3 in Varian (1980). Suppose not.
Then the there is a point mass in equilibrium, p˙ s.t. pr(p = p˙) > 0. Note that p˙ ∈ (0, v]
from Lemma A1. Because the number of point masses must be countable, there exists
an ε > 0 small such that p˙ − ε > 0 and is charged with probability zero. Consider a
deviation of a firm from the equilibrium F to a distribution over prices where the only
difference is that the new distribution charges p˙ − ε with probability pr(p = p˙) and p˙
with probability zero. Note that a firm appears in
(
n−1
q−1
)
of the groups of shoppers. Index
these groups z = 1, ...,
(
n−1
q−1
)
(this is without loss as F is symmetric). Let pr(p˙; t, z) be
the probability under F that a firm is cheapest in group z along with t = 0, ..., q − 1
others (due to symmetry, pr(p˙; t, z) is the same for all groups, so let this more simply
be termed pr(p˙; t)). Call the difference in profit due to the deviation d and note that:
lim
ε→0
d =
(n−1q−1)∑
z=1
q−1∑
t=0
pr(p˙; t, z)
α(
n
q
) (1− (1
q
+
q − (t+ 1)
q(t+ 1)
))
p˙
The term in parentheses is the difference in the amount of shoppers won under the
deviation and under F , in given group, when the firm along with t others charge p˙, and
p˙ is the lowest price in that group. Due to symmetry of the groups and that pr(p˙; t) > 0
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(because p˙ is a point mass in F ), this simplifies to:(
n−1
q−1
)(
n
q
) q−1∑
t=1
pr(p˙; t)α
(
t
t+ 1
)
p˙ > 0
hence for some ε > 0 there exists a profitable deviation, so F could not have been an
equilibrium.
Lemma A3. In any equilibrium, the maximum of the support of f must be v.
Proof: Suppose not. Define p¯ as the maximum element of the support and note that by
Lemma A2 the probability of a tie at any price is zero. By Lemma A1, p¯ ∈ (0, v).
Consider a firm called upon to play p¯ < v in equilibrium. They only sell to their auto-
renewers, making p¯ (1−α)
n
but would strictly prefer to deviate to v and make v (1−α)
n
, a
contradiction.
Proposition 1. In the unique equilibrium firms mix according to the distribution
F (p) = 1−
[
(v − p)(1− α)
qpα
] 1
q−1
over the support p ∈
[
v(1− α)
1 + α(q − 1) , v
]
.
Proof: By Lemma A2, there is more than one element of the equilibrium support, and
by Lemma A3 v is the maximal element. In equilibrium, a firm must be indifferent
between all elements of the support p, hence profit must equal v
(
1−α
n
)
for all p, that is:
v
(
1− α
n
)
= p
[
1− α
n
+
α(
n
q
)X(p)] (A1)
X(p) ≡
(
n− 1
q − 1
)(
n− 1
n− 1
)
F (p)0(1−F (p))n−1+...+
(
q − 1
q − 1
)(
n− 1
q − 1
)
F (p)n−q(1−F (p))q−1
The first term on the RHS of (A1) is the profit from ARs, who always purchase at
p ≤ v. The second term is the expected proportion of shoppers that a firm will win,
charging price p. Shoppers can be characterized by
(
n
q
)
groups, where the set of groups
is given by {1, ..., n}q. X(p) describes the expected number of groups a firm expects
to win given it charges p. By Lemma A2 there are no ties in price, so label prices
by p1 < ... < pn. p1 will be the cheapest in every group in which it appears, and it
appears in
(
n−1
q−1
)
of the groups. The probability of being the lowest price is given by(
n−1
n−1
)
F (p)0(1 − F (p))n−1, which accounts for the first term in X(p). The observation
that pi is the cheapest in
(
n−i
q−1
)
groups if i ≤ n−(q−1), zero groups otherwise, accounts
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for the remaining terms of X(p). The following manipulations to simplify the second
term on RHS of (A1) this make use of the binomial theorem:
= p
α(
n
q
) n−1∑
j=q−1
(
j
q − 1
)(
n− 1
j
)
F (p)n−j−1(1− F (p))j
which after some manipulations can be shown to be:
= pα
q
n
(1− F (p))q−1
rearranging for F (p) gives:
F (p) = 1−
[
(v − p)(1− α)
qpα
] 1
q−1
Notice that this is a well-defined c.d.f. over:
p ∈
[
v(1− α)
1 + α(q − 1) , v
]
Notice that v is strictly preferred to any p ∈
[
0, v(1−α)
1+α(q−1)
)
.
A3. A World With a PCW
I look for symmetric equilibria where PCWs charge some fee level c ≥ 0 and shop-
pers check PCWs in equilibrium. I do not look at equilibria where firms never list on
PCWs, where the setting without a PCW applies. To derive equilibria, one needs to
know the mutual best-responses of firms to unilateral deviations of PCWs. To do so,
take c and equilibrium shopper strategy as given, and consider the firm responses.
Let K ≥ 1 denote the number of PCWs and r : K ≥ r ≥ 1 the number of PCWs
checked by shoppers. In symmetric equilibrium, a proportion r
K
of each firm’s shoppers
check any given PCW. Define a vector of PCW fees as c = (c1, ..., cK) ∈ RK+ labeled
such that c1 ≤ ... ≤ cK . Let βk ∈ [0, 1] be the probability with which a firm enters
PCWk and define the event E: “all PCWs are empty”. Denote (a1, a2) = (p,K) as a
firm’s action, where p is the price charged and 2{1,...,K} is set of all combinations of
PCWs they could choose to list in where K a typical element, and ∅ denotes not listing
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on any PCW. Define the following CDF, which is used throughout:
G(p; c) = 1−
[
(v − p)(1− α)
α
(
np− (n− 1) 1
K
(c1 + · · ·+ cK)
)] 1n−1 (A2)
which is well-defined over the support [
¯
p(c), v] where
¯
p(c) =
v(1−α)+ 1
K
(c1+···+cK)α(n−1)
1+α(n−1) .
When c1 = · · · = cK ≡ c, let G(p; c) and
¯
p(c) also be written G(p; c) and
¯
p(c).
Lemma A4. In any equilibrium, there are no prices p charged s.t. p ≤ 0 or p > v.
Proof: No p ≤ 0 or p > v because they yield negative and zero profit respectively,
whereas (v, ∅) yields v(1−α)
n
> 0.
Lemma A5. If c1 ∈ [0, v(1− α)), pr(E) = 0.
Proof: Suppose pr(E) > 0. Denote the infimum of prices charged when no PCW is
listed on and that of prices ever listed on a PCW as p0 and
¯
p respectively. [Note the
infima exist because prices are a bounded from below by Lemma A4]. Note that p0 ≥
¯
p
because (
¯
p, ∅) is strictly preferred to any lower price as a firm faces no competition for
prices below
¯
p off the PCWs. Consider when the firm is called upon to play (p0, ∅) (or
a price arbitrarily closely above p0):
If p0 > c1, a deviation to (p0 − , 1) is strictly profitable. This is because with
probability pr(E)n−1 > 0 PCWs are empty with other firms charging at least p0. By
listing the firm then has a positive probability of winning α r
K
n−1
n
new shoppers. For
a sufficiently small  > 0, this will offset the arbitrary loss in revenue from its own
consumers.
If p0 ≤ c1, firm profit must be at least ¯pn which can be guaranteed by (
¯
p, 1), because
p0 ≥
¯
p. In turn, this must be at least as much as v(1−α)
n
which the firm can guarantee
by playing (v, ∅). Putting these together, p0 ≥
¯
p ≥ v(1 − α) > c1 which contradicts
p0 ≤ c1.
Lemma A6. If c1 ∈ [0, v(1− α)), firm strategies have no point masses.
Proof: Define
¯
p1(c1) as the price at which a firm is indifferent between selling to all
shoppers exclusively through the cheapest PCW(s) and charging v, only sell to auto-
renewers:
¯
p1(c1) =
v(1− α) + αc1(n− 1)
1 + α(n− 1)
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By Lemma A5, some (p,K) is played. Note that firms would by construction not play
(p,K) where p <
¯
p1(c1), strictly preferring (v, ∅). To see that there are no point masses:
If there were a point mass at (
¯
p1(c1),K) then there is a positive probability of being
tied for the lowest price at (
¯
p1(c1),K). By definition of
¯
p1(c1) firms would strictly
prefer to deviate to (v, ∅).
If there were a point mass at (p˙,K) s.t. p˙ >
¯
p1(c1) then there is a positive probability
of being tied for the lowest price at (p˙,K). A firm would strictly prefer to shift that
probability mass to (p˙− ,K′) where K′ = K \ {k : ck ≥ p˙}. Here, the firm would sell
to α r
K
n−1
n
other firms’ shoppers at an arbitrary loss in revenue from its own consumers.
There is always an  > 0 small enough to ensure this is profitable because
¯
p1(c1) >
c1 ⇐⇒ c1 < v(1− α).
Lemma A7. If there are no point masses, the maximum of the support f must be v.
Proof: This is a variant of Varian (1980) Proposition 7.
Lemma A8. If c1 ∈ [0, v(1− α)) and c1 < c2, β1 = 1.
Proof: By Lemma A5 it is never the case that all PCWs are empty. Suppose β1 < 1.
Lemma A6 implies there is more than one price, pˆ, that is listed on some other PCWs.
By Lemma A7 there is one such that pˆ < v. Consider a firm being called upon to
play this (pˆ,K-1) where 1 /∈ K-1 and m¯ = max{K-1}. As this price has a positive
probability of being the lowest of all firms, it will generate sales through the PCWs in
K-1. But as PCW1 is the unique cheapest PCW, there is a strictly profitable deviation
to (pˆ,K-1 ∪ 1 \ m¯).
Lemma A9. If c1 = . . . , cK ≡ c ∈ (v(1−α), v], firm pricing strategies are pure where
p ∈ [v(1− α), c]. Any (β1, . . . , βK) ∈ (0, 1]K can be supported.
Proof: Either there is a point mass or there is not.
1. Suppose there is a point mass at price p˙. If p˙ > c, firms have a strict incentive
to shift this mass to (p˙ − , {1, . . . , K}). If p˙ < v(1 − α), firms prefer to shift
this mass to (v, ∅). These leaves p˙ ∈ [v(1 − α), c] as the only points that can be
point masses. There can be at most one point mass: If not, then there a second
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point mass p¨ < c, which if played with K 6= ∅ would generate negative profit, so
(p¨, ∅) is preferred; if K = ∅, then (p¨ + , ∅) for some sufficiently small  > 0 is
preferred. To see that this pure pricing at p ∈ [v(1 − α), c] can be part of firm
strategies, note that firm profit is pi = p
n
≥ v(1−α)
n
, so there is no strict incentive to
sell only to auto-renewers instead. Because shoppers buy directly when prices are
all the same, there are no sales through PCWs and so firms are indifferent between
any (β1, . . . , βK) ∈ (0, 1]K .
2. Suppose there is no point mass. By Lemma A7 the maximum of the support is v,
where v is not the only element of the support, else it would be a point mass. There
is therefore a positive probability of a firm being the cheapest at some p. There can
be no (p,K) s.t. p < c charged: If K 6= ∅ played profit from these sales is negative,
so (p, ∅) is preferred; if K = ∅, then (p + , ∅) for some sufficiently small  > 0 is
preferred. Given p ∈ [c, v], pr(E) = 0. This follows because firms strictly prefer
(p, {1, . . . , K}) to (p, ∅) for all p ∈ (c, v). For any 1 ≤ r ≤ K firms are content
to list prices on at least as many PCWs as is necessary to make sure every shopper
sees their price e.g., for r = K = 1 all of them; for r = K, just one of them.
There can therefore, be different configurations of βK’s depending on r,K so long
as pr(E) = 0. To determine firm pricing strategy it must be that firms are indifferent
between every p they are called upon to play:
v
(
1− α
n
)
= p
(
1− α
n
)
+ (1−G(p; c))n−1
[
α
n
p+
α(n− 1)
n
(p− c)
]
which can be re-arranged to give G(p; c) from (A2). However,
¯
p(c) < c because
c > v(1 − α), so firms would make strictly negative profits at prices p ∈ (
¯
p(c), c),
preferring not to list. This provides a contradiction, so there do not exist strategic
firm responses with no point masses.
A4. Results for K = 1 or r = 1
Lemma A10. If r = 1, c1 = · · · = cK−1 ∈ [0, v(1 − α)) and cK ∈ [c1,
¯
p(c)): βk = 1
for all k where firms mix by CDF G(p; c).
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Proof: By Lemma A5 there is always some price posted on some PCW(s). By Lemma A6
these prices are not point masses and by Lemma A7 the maximum of the support is v,
where only auto-renewers are sold to. There is therefore a positive probability of a sale
through some PCW(s) at some (p,K). If k ∈ K where k < K and sales there are
profitable (when p > c1), then {1, . . . , K − 1} ∈ K; if K ∈ K and sales there are
profitable p > cK (whether or not p > cK is the only consideration because r = 1), it
follows that {1, . . . , K} ∈ K. To be part of firm strategy, it must also be that firms pre-
fer to play (p,K) than to charge v and sell only to their auto-renewers. Note that
¯
p(c)
from (A2) is the price at which firms are indifferent between selling through {1, . . . , K}
with certainty and selling only to their auto-renewers. Similarly, denote
¯
p-K(c) as the
indifference point between selling for sure on {1, . . . , K − 1} and charging v, and note
¯
p-K(c) <
¯
p(c). There will then be no (p, {1, . . . , K − 1}) played s.t. p <
¯
p-K(c) and
no (p, {1, . . . , K}) s.t. p <
¯
p(c). For prices close to v, K = {1, . . . , K}. To determine
firm pricing strategy, it must be that firms are indifferent between every (p, {1, . . . , K})
they are called upon to play:
v
(
1− α
n
)
= p
(
1− α
n
)
+(1−G(p; c))n−1
[
α
n
p+
α(n− 1)
n
(
p−
(
c1
K − 1
K
+ cK
1
K
))]
which can be re-arranged forG(p; c) to give the CDF from (A2). Because the minimum
of the support is
¯
p(c) > cK ≥ c1 (the first relation follows because c1 < v(1− α)), all
prices in the support generate profitable sales through all the PCWs, there is no price
charged s.t. p ∈ [
¯
p-K(c),
¯
p(c)). It follows that βk = 1 for all k. For K = 1, let
c1 ∈ [0, v(1− α)) and set K = 1 in the expressions of the Lemma.
Lemma A11. If r = 1 and c = v(1− α) there are the following firm responses:
1. Pure-price strategies where p = v(1− α) is the only price ever charged. Here, any
(β1, . . . , βK) ∈ (0, 1]K can be supported.
2. Mixed-price strategies where βk = 1 for all k and prices are distributed according
to the CDF G(p; v(1− α)) where
¯
p(v(1− α)) = v(1− α).
Proof: Either there is a point mass or there is not.
1. Suppose there is a point mass at price p˙. If p˙ > c, firms have a strict incentive
to shift this mass to (p˙ − , {1, . . . , K}). If p˙ < c, firms have a strict incentive to
35
shift this mass to (v, ∅). These leaves p˙ = c as the only point that can be a point
mass. To see that this pure pricing can be part of firm strategies, note that firm profit
is pi = c1
n
= v(1−α)
n
, so there is no strict incentive to sell only to auto-renewers
instead. Because shoppers buy directly when prices are all the same, there are no
sales through PCWs and so firms are indifferent between any (β1, . . . , βK) ∈ (0, 1]K .
2. Suppose there is no point mass. By Lemma A6, v is the maximum of the support of
prices. No prices p < c are charged because (v, ∅) is strictly preferred. For p > c,
sales through all PCWs are profitable so βk = 1 for all k. When v is played, firm
profit is pi(v) = v(1−α)
n
. To determine firm pricing strategy, it must be that firms are
indifferent between every p they are called upon to play:
pi(v) = p
(
1−α
n
)
+ α
n
(1−G(p; v(1− α)))n−1 [np− (n− 1)v(1− α)] . (A3)
which can be re-arranged to give the CDF from (A2).
Lemma A12. If r = 1, c1 = · · · = cK−1 = v(1 − α) and cK ∈ (c1, v] there exist firm
responses in pure-price strategies where v(1− α) is the only price ever charged. Here,
any (β1, . . . , βK) ∈ (0, 1]K can be supported.
Proof: In such an equilibrium, firm profit is pi = v(1−α)
n
. Consider a deviation to p. If
p ∈ (v(1 − α), v], deviation profit is pˆi = p(1−α)
n
≤ pi. If p < v(1 − α), firms have a
strict incentive to shift this mass to (v, ∅). Because shoppers buy directly when prices
are all the same, there are no sales through PCWs and so firms are indifferent between
any (β1, . . . , βK) ∈ (0, 1]K .
Lemma 1. The mutual best-responses of firms as a function of c:
1. If c ∈ [0, v(1 − α)), firm responses have no point masses, and are described by
G(p; c).
2. If c = v(1−α), there are two classes of response, one with no point masses described
by G(p, c), and those that are degenerate.
36
3. If c ∈ (v(1− α), v], firm responses are degenerate.
Where pricing is described by G(p; c) each firm always lists its price on the PCW.
Proof: See Lemmas A10, A11 and A9 respectively.
Proposition 2. In the unique equilibrium where shoppers check the PCW, the PCW
sets a click-through fee of c = v (1− α), firms list on the PCW and mix over prices
according to G(p; v(1− α)) over the support p ∈ [v(1− α), v].
Proof:
If c ∈ [0, v(1−α)), Lemma A10 shows that there is a profitable upward deviation to
c ∈ (c1,
¯
p(c)). It is profitable because there is an increase in fee-level but no reduction
in the quantity of sales.
If c ∈ (v(1− α), v], Lemma A9 shows that firms will play pure-price strategies and
so u = 0. If c = v(1 − α) and firms play pure-pricing strategies, then u = 0 again.
In these cases, Lemma A10 shows that a deviation to c ∈ (0, v(1 − α)) will generate
u1 > 0, so there are no equilibria where c ∈ (v(1 − α), v] or for c = v(1 − α) when
firms respond with pure-pricing strategies.
If c = v(1 − α) and firms mix over prices by G(p; v(1 − α)) as in Lemma A11,
equilibrium PCW profit is u∗ = v(1−α) α
K
n−1
n
> 0. Lemma A9 shows that any upward
deviation would yield u = 0. There can be no profitable deviation downwards because,
as Lemma A10 shows, the fee would be reduced for no gain in the quantity of sales.
Proposition 3. Both types of consumer are worse off with the PCW than without.
Proof of Proposition 3: First I show that auto-renewers are worse off under G(p; v(1−
α)) than F (p) (referred to as G and F here). Auto-renewers pay the price quoted by
their current firm. To show they are worse off with the PCW, I show that EF [p] < EG[p]
by showing that G first-order stochastic dominates (FOSDs) F . The distributions share
the same upper bound on their supports, with F having a lower lower bound. Hence, G
FOSDs F if G(p; v(1− α)) ≤ F (p) for p ∈ [v(1− α), v], which can be re-arranged as[
(v − p)(1− α)
αqp
] 1
q−1
≤
[
(v − p)(1− α)
αnp− αv(1− α)(n− 1)
] 1
n−1
.
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This holds because the terms in parentheses are in [0,1], the power on of the LHS is
larger and the denominator on the LHS is larger iff p(n− q) ≤ v(1− α)(n− 1) which
is satisfied because p ≤ v(1− α) and n− q < n− 1.
To show shoppers are worse off under G than F , first show that EF [p(1,2)] is lower
than the lower bound of the support of g in the case of q = 2. Then, I use Proposition 3
of Morgan et al. (2006) which corresponds to my setup (the only difference is that they
have v = 1), which states that EF [p(1,2)] is decreasing in q. Hence I show the first step
here to prove that EF [p(1,2)] is below v(1− α) for all q. For q = 2,
EF
[
p(1,2)
]
=
v∫
v[ 1−α1+α ]
f
(
p(1,2)
)
pdp
where f
(
p(1,2)
)
= 2 (1− F (p)) f(p) is the density function of the lower of the two
draws shoppers receive from F . Computing yields
EF
[
p(1,2)
]
=
(
1− α
α
)2
v
2
[
log
(
1− α
1 + α
)
+
2α
1− α
]
.
Then EF
[
p(1,2)
]
< v (1− α) can be rearranged to obtain
log
(
1 + α
1− α
)
> 2α
which holds for α ∈ (0, 1).
Corollary 1. Within the mixed-price equilibrium firm responses of Lemma 1, as c ∈
[0, v(1− α)] increases, the expected price paid by both types of consumer increases.
Proof: From Lemma 1 the pricing strategy for c ∈ [0, v(1−α)] is given by, G(p; c) over
[
¯
p(c), v]. Differentiating,
dG (p; c)
dc
=
1
c(n− 1)− np
(
(v − p) (1− α)
αnp− α (n− 1) c
) 1
n−1
.
The second term is ≥ 0 else G(p; c) > 1. The first term is ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ cn−1
n
< p
which is ensured because p ≥ c > cn−1
n
when c ≤ v(1 − α) (this follows because
¯
p(c) ≥ c ⇐⇒ v(1 − α) ≥ c). Then for any c, c′ ∈ [0, v(1 − α)], if c > c′ then the
equilibrium pricing distribution under c first order stochastic dominates that under c′.
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Hence the expected price (paid by auto-renewers) and the expected lowest price from n
draws (paid by shoppers) are higher under c.
Corollary 2. As the number of firms increases, the expected price paid by shoppers
decreases, but the expected price paid by auto-renewers increases.
Proof: Using an observation from Morgan et al. (2006), industry profit of firms is given
by αEG[p(1,n)] + (1−α)EG[p] = v(1−α), where EG[p(1,n)] denotes the lowest price of
n draws fromG(p; v(1−α)) and EG[p] denotes the expected price fromG(p; v(1−α)).
The RHS is the industry profit of firms if it charged v and only sold to auto-renewers.
Differentiating and rearranging,
dEG[p(1,n)]
dn
= −
(
1− α
α
)
dEG[p]
dn
so the derivatives have opposite signs. Now show that EG[p]
dn
≥ 0. To do this, show that
G(p, v(1− α)) is stochastically ordered in n:
dG(p; v(1− α))
dn
≤ 0
⇐⇒ log
(
(v − p)(1− α)
α(np− v(1− α)(n− 1)
)
+
(n− 1)(p− v(1− α))
np− v(1− α)(n− 1) ≡ X(p) ≤ 0.
Note that X(v(1− α)) = 0, and dX
dp
< 0:
dX(p)
dp
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ p ≥ v(1− α)
[
(2n− 2 + α(n− 1)2)
(2n− 1 + α(n− 1)2)
]
.
Notice that the term on RHS in square brackets is below 1. Recall that p ≥ v(1− α) as
this is the lower bound of the support, hence this is satisfied.
Proposition 4. With K > 1 competing PCWs, if shoppers check r = 1 PCW then both
types of consumer are worse off with the PCWs than without.
Proof: There are no equilibria where c ∈ [0, v(1 − α)): Lemma A10 shows that there
is a profitable upward deviation to cK ∈ (c1,
¯
p(c)). It is profitable because there is an
increase in fee-level but no reduction in the quantity of sales. Note that there can be no
profitable deviation downwards given r = 1 because the fee would be reduced for no
gain in the quantity of sales.
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There are no equilibria where c ∈ (v(1−α), v]: Lemma A9 shows uk = 0 for all k.
Lemmas A6 and A8 show that a deviation to c1 ∈ (0, v(1− α)) will generate u1 > 0.
The only remaining option is c1 = · · · = cK ≡ c = v(1− α), where firm responses
are described by Lemma A11. If firms play a pure-pricing strategy, then as in the previ-
ous case, PCWs make zero profit and there is a profitable deviation to c1 ∈ (0, v(1−α)).
If however, firms respond with the mixed-price strategy, this fee-level is an equilibrium:
There can be no profitable deviation downwards for PCWs because the fee would be
reduced for no gain in the quantity of sales as r = 1. Following an upward deviation
from PCWK to cK ∈ (v(1− α), v], when firms respond with a pure-pricing strategy as
detailed in Lemma A11, PCWK’s profit falls to zero. There is then an equilibrium at
this fee level, and it is the unique such level where there exists an equilibrium.
At this fee-level, firms play just as they did when K = 1 with the same CDF over
prices and all PCWs list all n firm prices. Both types of consumer are therefore left with
the same level of surplus they had under K = 1.
Corollary 3. When pricing is determined by G(p; c), as the proportion of shoppers α
increases, expected prices for both types of consumer decrease.
Proof: Differentiating G(p; c) by α,
dG (p; c)
dα
=
1
α(n− 1)(1− α)
(
(v − p) (1− α)
αnp− α (n− 1) c
) 1
n−1
The first term is > 0. The second term is always ≥ 0 or G(p; c) > 1. Then for any
α, α′ ∈ (0, 1), if α > α′ then the equilibrium pricing distribution under α′ first order
stochastic dominates that under α. Hence the expected price (paid by auto-renewers)
and the expected lowest price from n draws (paid by shoppers) are lower under α.
Corollary 4. If the PCW can determine α as well as c in the preliminary stage, then the
PCW sets α = 1
2
.
Proof: I expand the PCW’s action set to include α ∈ (0, 1). Notice that for any choice
of α ∈ (0, 1), by the reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 2, the PCW will avoid the
pure equilibria of Lemma 1 so c ∈ [0, v(1 − α)], firms mix and the PCW is given by
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cα
(
n−1
n
)
. The PCWs optimization problem can hence be solved by,
max
c,α
cα
(
n−1
n
)
s.t. c ∈ [0, v(1− α)] and α ∈ (0, 1)
where the solution is c = v(1− α), α = 1
2
.
A5. Results for K > 1 and r > 1
Lemma A13. If r > 1, c1 = · · · = cK−1 ∈ [0, v), cK ∈ (c1, v], uK = 0.
Proof: This Lemma says that there is no profitable upwards deviation for a PCW from
any equilibrium. Consider such a unilateral deviation by PCWK . Firm response can
either be pure or mixed pricing. If pure, then uk = 0 for all k. If mixed, then at any
price p that has positive probability of sales through PCWs where K ∈ K, firms have
a strict preference to play (p, {1, . . . , K − 1}) instead. This is because r > 1: Every
shopper who sees the prices on PCWK also sees the prices on another PCW. Firms can
therefore avoid PCWK’s higher fee by not listing there while facing no reduction in the
quantity of sales.
Lemma A14. If r = K, c2 = · · · = cK ∈ (0, v(1 − α)] and c1 ∈ [0, c2): β1 = 1,
βk = 0 for k = 2, . . . K and prices are distributed according to the CDF G(p, c1).
Proof: There are no point masses by Lemma A6. By Lemma A8 β1 = 1. βk = 0 for
k = 2, . . . , K follows because all shoppers check every PCW (r = K). Therefore, at
any price p that has positive probability of generating sales through PCWs, firms have
a strict preference only to list on PCW1 without any reduction in the quantity of sales.
By Lemma A7 the maximum of the support is v. Firms must be indifferent to all (p, 1)
they are called upon to play, hence:
v
(
1−α
n
)
= p
(
1−α
n
)
+ α
n
(1−G(p; c1))n−1 [np− (n− 1)c1] .
which can be re-arranged to give G(p, c1) from (A2).
Proposition 5. With K > 1 competing PCWs, shoppers are guaranteed to be better off
than before the introduction of PCWs if and only if they check all PCWs: The unique
equilibrium PCW fee-level is c = 0 if and only if r = K > 1.
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Proof: Sufficiency: Suppose not. Then there exists an equilibrium with c > 0. By
Lemma A13, there is no profitable upward deviation. Now consider a downward devia-
tion. If c ∈ [v(1− a), v] and firms respond with a pure-pricing equilibrium, as detailed
in Lemma A9, then uk = 0. A deviation by PCW1 to c1 ∈ (0, v(1 − α)) would lead
to the responses detailed in Lemma A14 and deviation profit of u1 = cαn−1n > 0. If
c ∈ (0, v(1 − a)] and firms respond with by mixing by G(p, c), as in Lemma A14,
then uk = c αK
n−1
n
> 0 for all k. But a deviation by PCW1 to c1 < c exists s.t.
u1 = c1α
n−1
n
> c α
K
n−1
n
= uk. This deviation is strictly profitable, so c could not have
been an equilibrium. To see that c = 0 is an equilibrium, recall that by Lemma A13
there is no profitable upward deviation.
Necessity: Lemma A11 shows that for K ≥ r = 1 the unique equilibrium fee level
is c = v(1 − α). Lemma 2 shows that for 1 < r < K there are multiple equilibria.
Hence K = r > 1 is the only case where the unique equilibrium of c = 0 obtains.
Consumer welfare: As noted in the text, as firms make the same expected profit in
both worlds, there is a one-to-one relation between consumer welfare and PCW profit.
To see the difference in the changes to shopper and auto-renewer welfare from a move
to a world with a PCW but c = 0, Proposition 3 of Morgan et al. (2006) (the only
difference is that they have v = 1) shows that the increase from q to n results in a
reduction in the expected price paid by shoppers, and an increase for auto-renewers.
Lemma 2. When K > r > 1, there exists an equilibrium in which PCWs charge c¯ > 0,
firms list on all PCWs, mixing over prices by G(p; c¯) where
c¯ =
v(1− α)Kr(K − r)
K(1 + r(K − 2)) + αr(K − 1)(r − 1)(n− 1) .
Proof: I show that there exist equilibria such that c ∈ [0, c¯]. Note that c¯ ∈ [0, v(1− α))
hence any c ∈ [0, v(1 − α)). Take such a c as a candidate equilibrium fee level. There
are no point masses by Lemma A6. By Lemma A7 the maximum of the support is v.
By Lemma A5 pr(E) = 0 and as all PCWs charge the same fee, firms are content to
list in all of them i.e., βk = 1 for all k. Firms must be indifferent to all (p, {1, . . . , K})
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they are called upon to play, hence
v
(
1−α
n
)
= p
(
1−α
n
)
+ α
n
(1−G(p; c))n−1 [np− (n− 1)c]
which can be re-arranged to give G(p; c) in (A2).
To confirm c is an equilibrium fee level, ensure there is no profitable PCW deviation.
By Lemma A13, there is no profitable upward deviation. However, unlike Lemma A14,
when 1 < r < K it is no longer true that any undercut by PCW1 to c1 < c will result
in all firms listing on it exclusively. This is because consumers see r > 1 PCWs: when
a firm sells having played (p, {1, . . . , K}) it pays c1 1K + cK−1K , but were it to have
played (p, 1) it would have paid c1 rK i.e., the firm faces a trade-off between lower fees
and higher sales volume. By Lemma A8 β1 = 1. PCW1’s deviation profit is therefore
determined by βk, k > 1. For small-enough undercuts of c, firms will still be content to
list on all PCWs. Suppose however, that PCW1 undercuts by just enough such that such
that firms are no longer content to list all their prices on the other PCWs. In the best case
for PCW1, βk = 0 for all k so that all shoppers checking PCW1 buy only through PCW1.
If in this case, PCW1 still does not make more than its equilibrium profit u∗ = c αK
n−1
n
,
then the undercut is never profitable and c constitutes an equilibrium fee level. I now
carry out this logic.
Denote c1 < c as the undercut of PCW1 and c˜1 as the threshold level required
for c1 to entice firms to de-list some of their prices from PCWk s.t. k > 1. Given
c = (c1, c, . . . , c), similarly to the derivation above, one can show firms will respond
by G(p; c) over [
¯
p(c), v] as in (A2). Firm deviation profit from this response to (p, 1) is
given by
pi(p) = p
(
1− α
n
)
+
(v − p)(1− α) [Kp− r(p− c1)(n− 1)]
n (Knp− (n− 1)(c1 + c(K − 1))) .
Note that this is valid for p ∈ [
¯
p(c), v], but p <
¯
p1 give strictly less profit than p =
¯
p(c).
One can show that pi(p) is convex in p. Together with the observation that (v, 1) gives
the equilibrium profit v(1−α)
n
, this says that the optimal deviation is to (
¯
p(c), 1) and is
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profitable if and only if pi(
¯
p(c)) > v(1−α)
n
, which can be rearranged to give
c1 <
c(K − 1)(K + rα(n− 1))−Kv(K − r)(1− α)
rα(K − 1)(n− 1) +K(r − 1) ≡ c˜1.
Suppose that the firm response following the undercut was such that βk = 0 for all
k > 1 when PCW1 sets the highest such undercut just below c˜1. PCW1 prefers not to
make the deviation whenever
u∗ ≥ c˜1αr
K
n− 1
n
⇐⇒ c
r
≥ c˜1
which can be rearranged to give
c ≤ v(1− α)Kr(K − r)
K(1 + r(K − 2)) + αr(K − 1)(r − 1)(n− 1) ≡ c¯.
Therefore at fee levels c ∈ [0, c¯] there exist equilibria where βk = 1 for all k and firms
mix by the CDF given in the Lemma.
Proposition 6. For any r, there exists a K˜ such that as long as there are more than
K˜ aggregators both types of consumer can be worse off than before the introduction of
any PCWs.
Proof: To show for shoppers, let the equilibrium be given as in Lemma 2 with c = c¯
and see that
lim
K→∞
c¯ = v(1− α). (A4)
For shopper welfare notice that for K = r, c¯ = 0 and
EF [p(1,q)] ≥ EG(0)[p(1,n)] (A5)
where G(c) and F denote G(p; c) and F (p). This is because the PCWs effectively
increase the number of firms competing for each shoppers from q to n, and from the last
point of the proof of Proposition 5, this lowers the price paid by shoppers. Proposition 3
shows that both types are worse off with PCWs when c = v(1 − α) for K ≥ r = 1,
but notice that if c = v(1 − α) in equilibrium with K > r ≥ 1, then this will be true a
fortiori, because it can be shown that G(v(1 − α)) first-order stochastically dominates
F for all q. By (A4) then as K → ∞, EF [p(1,q)] < EG(v(1−α))[p(1,n)]. Because c¯ is
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continuous in K, dc¯
dK
> 0 and dEG(c¯)[p(1,n)]
dK
> 0 by Corollary 1, there exists K˜ s.t. for
K > K˜ there is always an equilibrium fee level that makes shoppers worse off relative
to a world without PCWs.
The proof for auto-renewers is similar but simpler to the above steps for shoppers
and has p replacing p(1,q) and p(1,n): From Proposition 3 of Morgan et al. (2006), the
effect of increasing the number of firms competing for each shopper increases prices for
auto-renewers. Then by Corollary 1, their prices only rise further under G(c). Hence
auto-renewers are worse off for any c and hence any K.
A6. Results under Publicly Observable Fees
Definition (Coordinated Subgame). Given c, a ‘coordinated subgame’ is when shop-
pers attend and firms list in only the cheapest PCWs i.e., shoppers in PCWk if ck = c1,
and for firms βk = 1 if ck = c1 else βk = 0. Firms mix by G(p, c1).
Lemma A15. When fees are observed by shoppers, and all subgames are ‘coordinated
subgames’ there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium where c = 0, βk = 1 for all k
and prices are distributed according to the CDF G(p, 0).
Proof: There are no profitable deviations for firms: G(p, 0) ensures they are indifferent
between listing all prices in the support [
¯
p(0), v], listing any price less than
¯
p(0) is less
profitable than listing v, and any (p, ∅) generates at most v(1−α)
n
when p = v. To see
there is no profitable upward deviation for PCWs, note that due to the ‘coordinated
subgame’ shoppers and firms would not attend this PCW following such a deviation,
so the PCW receives zero profit. To see that these coordination subgames are Nash
equilibria: for firms one can conduct the same round of checks as at the beginning of
this proof; for consumers notice that as the non-cheapest PCWs are all empty, there is
no incentive to check them.
Proposition 7. When K > 1 and PCW fees are observed by shoppers, there exists an
equilibrium with c = 0.
Proof: That there exists an equilibrium with c = 0 follows directly from Lemma A15.
For shopper welfare at c = 0, see the last point of the proof of Proposition 5.
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A7. Results under Price Discrimination
Now assume that different prices can be charged directly and through the PCW.
Denote such prices p0 and pk respectively, where k = 1, . . . , K indexes the PCW as
before.
Lemma A16. If r = 1, c1 = · · · = cK−1 = v(1 − α) and cK ∈ [c1, v] then there exist
firm responses s.t. p0 = p1 = · · · = pK = v(1− α) and βk = 1 for all k.
Proof: Under these strategies, firm profit is pi = v(1−α)
n
. There is no profitable deviation
involving pk for any k: lower would prompt sales at pk < ck, higher would never attract
any shoppers. There is no profitable deviation involving p0: lower would still sell to
auto-renewers and own-shoppers but at a lower price, higher would only sell to auto-
renewers for which the optimal such deviation is to v generating profit v(1−α)
n
= pi.
Proposition 8. With price discrimination, if r = 1, there exists an equilibrium in which
PCWs set c = v(1−α), firms list on all PCWs, p0 = v and p1 = · · · = pK = v(1−α).
Proof: Given c1 = · · · = cK ≡ c = v(1 − α), let us confirm there are no profitable
deviations for firms. Equilibrium firm profit is pi = v(1−α)
n
. There is no profitable
deviation involving pk for any k: lower would prompt sales at pk < ck, higher would
never attract any shoppers. There is no profitable deviation involving p0: lower would
either sell only to auto-renewers at a lower price, or to both auto-renewers and own-
shoppers but only for prices at least as low as v(1 − α), generating profit no greater
than v(1−α)
n
; higher would be above v and hence make zero profits. Now consider a
PCW deviation. Equilibrium PCW profit is uk =
αv(1−α)
K
> 0. There is no profitable
deviation to a lower fee: as r = 1 doing so would at best sell to the same proportion of
shoppers ( α
K
) but at a lower fee. As for a deviation to a higher fee: assume that firms’
mutual best responses are given by those in Lemma A16 where PCW profit is zero.
Corollary 5. When firms price discriminate, following c1 ∈ (0, c2) and c2 = c3 =
, . . . ,= cK ≡ c ∈ (0, v(1−α)] there exist mutual best-responses of firms such that they
list on all PCWs, setting p0 = v and pk = · · · = ck for all k.
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Proof: Given c as in the Lemma, let us confirm there are no profitable deviations for
firms. Firm profit is pi = v(1−α)
n
. There is no profitable deviation involving pk for
any k: lower could prompt sales, but only at pk < ck, higher would never attract any
shoppers. There is no profitable deviation involving p0: lower would either sell only to
auto-renewers at a lower price, or to both auto-renewers and own-shoppers but only for
prices at least as low as c2, generating profit no greater than c2n < pi; higher would be
above v and hence make zero profits.
Lemma A17. If r > 1, c1 = · · · = cK−1 = 0 and cK ∈ [0, v] then there exist firm
responses s.t. p0 = v, p1 = · · · = pK−1 = 0, βk = 1 for k < K and βK = 0.
Proof: Under these strategies, firm profit is pi = v(1−α)
n
. There is no profitable deviation
involving pK : pK < 0 would give sell at a loss whereas pK > 0 would never attract
any shoppers as r > 1. There is no profitable deviation involving pk for any k < K:
Lower would only create sales at a loss, higher would never attract any shoppers. There
is no profitable deviation involving p0: lower would still sell to auto-renewers and (for
p0 ≤ 0) own-shoppers but at a lower price, higher would sell to no-one.
Lemma A18. If r > 1, there exists an equilibrium where c = 0, firms list on all PCWs,
p0 = v and p1 = · · · = pK = 0..
Proof: One can follow the proof of Proposition 8 to confirm there are no profitable
deviations for firms. For PCWs, one only need consider an upward deviation in fee
level in which case, assume firms respond as in Lemma A17, which yields zero profit
for the deviating PCW.
Proposition 9. For n → ∞, following the introduction of a PCW, the expected prices
faced by both types of consumer in the setting without price discrimination (Proposi-
tion 2) are the same as in the setting with price discrimination (Proposition 8).
Proof: Taking limits,
lim
n→∞
G(p; c) = 0
which shows lim
n→∞
EG[p] = v. The CDF for the lowest of n draws is given by
H(p; c) = 1− (1−G(p; c))n = 1−
[
(v − p)(1− α)
α (np− (n− 1)c)
] n
n−1
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for p ∈ [
¯
p(c), v]. Taking limits,
lim
n→∞
H(p; c) = 1 and lim
n→∞¯
p(c) = c
which shows lim
n→∞
EG[p(1,n)] = c. These prices are the same as those in the equilibrium
of Proposition 8.
A8. Results with Search Costs
In the world without a PCW under q = 2, one can compute
EF [p] =
v
2
[
1− α
α
] [
log
(
1 + α
1− α
)]
EF [p(1,2)] =
v
2
[
1− α
α
]2 [
log
(
1− α
1 + α
)
+
2α
1− α
]
B0 =
v
2
[
1− α
α2
] [
log
(
1 + α
1− α
)
− 2α
]
.
In the world with a PCW under n→∞, Proposition 9 shows that,
EG[p] = v, EG[p(1,∞)] = c, B1 = v − c
where c = v(1− α˜) ≤ v(1− α) in equilibrium.
Proposition 10. Shoppers, converts and non-converts can all be worse off with a PCW
than without.
Proof: This is a proof by example. Let v = 1, α = 0.7, n = 3 and q = 2. Then, in the
world without a PCW, it can be computed that,
EF [p] = 0.3717, EF [p(1,2)] = 0.2693, B0 = 0.1024.
In the world with a PCW, assume α˜ = 0.71 (i.e., the PCW attracts 0.01 more consumers
i.e., 1
30
auto-renewers, to compare prices), so c = v(1− α) = 0.29 and
EG[p] = 0.5557, EG[p(1,3)] = 0.3748, B1 = 0.1808.
Comparing, one can see that if there is an S such that this can be rationalized as an
equilibrium, then all types of consumer will be worse off with a PCW than without. To
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rationalize, I construct an S such that:
S(B1) =

0 if B1 <
¯
s
B1 −
¯
s
B1
else
where
¯
s is determined by
S(0.1808) =
1
30
⇐⇒
¯
s = 0.1748.
Finally, notice that
¯
s > B0.
Lemma A19. Under maximum potential, any α˜ can be rationalized by an S.
Proof: Note that any α˜ can be rationalized with an S (as in the proof of Proposition 10)
because B0 < B1. To see this holds, one can show that B0 < vα holds for any α ∈
(0, 1) and hence so does B0 < vα˜.
Proposition 11. If the market has maximum potential: converts are better off; shoppers
can be worse off; and non-converts are worse off with a PCW than without.
Proof: As v(1−α) > v(1− α˜) when there are converts, to show converts are better off
with a PCW under maximum potential one can show,
EF [p] > v(1− α) ⇐⇒ log
(
1 + α
1− α
)
> 2α
which is satisfied for α ∈ (0, 1). Note that α˜ is rationalizable by some S (Lemma A19).
Shoppers are worse off under maximum potential wherever v(1 − α˜) > EF [p(1,2)].
To show this can occur, note that v(1 − α) > EF [p(1,2)] holds for all α ∈ (0, 1) (see
Proposition 3). Hence for any α there exists some α˜ > α small enough such that
shoppers are worse off. Note that such a α˜ is rationalizable by some S (Lemma A19).
Non-converts are worse off under maximum potential because EF [p] < EG[p] = v.
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Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling: An Account of
the Attraction, Compromise and Similarity Effects
1. Introduction
How do we choose between a small apartment close to our workplace and a larger
apartment with a longer commuting distance? How do we weigh the price of a hotel
against its Hotels.com quality rating, and how do we select between two different em-
ployees when personality favors one but sales figures favor the other? Such choices,
involving objects that differ on multiple attributes, are ubiquitous in everyday life.
A particular challenge to models of multi-attribute choice is given by three much-
studied context effects, each of which is of both theoretical and practical importance:
the similarity effect (Tversky, 1972), the attraction effect (Huber et al., 1982) and the
compromise effect (Simonson, 1989). Initial explanations focused on one or two of
these effects at a time, making reference to decision strategies such as elimination-
by-aspects (Tversky, 1972) or concepts such as loss aversion (Simonson and Tversky,
1992). Models have however typically had difficulty in accounting for all three effects
within a unifying framework without resorting to arguably ad hoc parameters or sepa-
rate mechanisms in order to capture all three effects simultaneously. Here we offer a
concise account based on a single mechanism: Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling
(MADS). MADS combines and extends three independently-developed ideas: (i) that
individuals compare targets with comparison items; (ii) that comparisons are based on
simple dominance relations; and (iii) that comparison items are systematically influ-
enced by the choice set faced.
According to MADS, the evaluation of an alternative is based on how it fares relative
to comparators in the mental choice context. Faced with a choice set, an individual
draws a sample of items to mind. A choice alternative then accrues a point for every
item in the sample (and every other item in the choice set) that it dominates.1 The
1If many choice alternatives dominate a sampled item, one of the dominating alternatives is selected
at random to accrue a point.
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alternative with the highest score is then selected.
We test the model’s explanation of context effects with two experiments. In the first,
we manipulate choice. The treatment exposes individuals to a selection of items that
are dominated by some of the choice alternatives in order to affect the items that are
brought to mind during choice. The overall effect was that alternatives promoted by our
treatment were chosen 7% more often. Our theory is based on simple dominance rela-
tions where an item dominates another when it is considered better on all its attributes.
We use two-attribute choice items (hotels that vary in price and quality) and find that the
treatment effect can be decomposed as 17% for those participants who reported paying
equal attention to both attributes (the majority), whereas there was no effect for those
reporting unequal attention.
The choice manipulations fed through to impact the size and significance of the clas-
sic context effects. Our design allowed us to attempt to enhance and counter the effects.
Doing so, our treatment is shown to cause the attraction effect to be doubled and then to
be reduced by enough to be insignificantly different from zero i.e., the attraction effect
is turned off. The compromise and similarity effect were also significantly manipulated,
but by less than the attraction effect. In particular, although the similarity effect was not
replicated, it was enhanced by enough to be significantly difference from zero i.e., the
similarity effect was turned on.
In a second experiment, we elicited the distributions which MADS assumes indi-
viduals sample comparison items from. We show that these distributions (aggregated
over individuals) depend on the choice faced. Furthermore, the dependence of these
aggregate distributions is such that the model predicts the context effects to occur in ex-
pectation. We then examine individual-level distributions and show that MADS predicts
the choices in most of our conditions. To predict individual choice, we also estimate
the model’s central parameter: the number of comparison items brought to mind. We
find this to be four, which we note is a psychologically realistic value for the capacity
of human working memory (Cowan, 2001).
The paper is organized as follows. After a review of the attraction, similarity, and
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compromise effects, we note that extant cognitive and economic models are limited in
their ability to provide a unified account in which all three effects emerge naturally with-
out the need for additional effect-specific mechanisms. We then provide an informal
intuitive account of how MADS accounts for context effects. We then report two exper-
iments to test the predictions of MADS that (a) changing the distribution of background
stimuli (hotels varying in price and quality rating) seen by participants will change their
choices in ways predicted by MADS, thus enabling us to counter or enhance all three
context effects in predictable ways, and (b) participants’ inferred distributions will be
changed in predictable ways by the context of choice options confronting participants.
2. Context Effects
We illustrate the three context effects in Figure 1 where items are located within two-
dimensional price×quality space. Consider the low-quality, low-price optionA, and the
higher-quality, higher-price option B. An attraction effect occurs when one of two op-
tions is more likely to be chosen when a third option that is dominated by it (but not
dominated by the other) is introduced, e.g., p(A|{A,B, TA}) > p(A|{A,B, TB}). A
compromise effect occurs when an option is more likely to be chosen when it becomes
an intermediate option, e.g., p(B|{A,B,CB}) > p(B|{A,B,CA}). A similarity effect
occurs when a third option that is similar to one of the alternatives increases the proba-
bility of choosing the dissimilar alternative, e.g., p(A|{A,B, SA}) > p(A|{A,B, SB}).
57
Figure 1: Context effects
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Note here that because a higher price is less pre-
ferred, indifference curves have positive slopes.
Hollow dots represent the various decoys that join
A and B to make up ternary context-effect choice
sets.
These “big three” context effects are found when psychophysical stimuli are used
(Trueblood et al., 2013; Tsetsos et al., 2012) in memory retrieval (Maylor and Roberts,
2007), inference tasks (Trueblood, 2012), and in-store purchasing (Doyle et al., 1999)
as well as the lab (e.g., Pettibone and Wedell, 2000; Wedell, 1991).
3. Literature
Several models of the three context effects have been put forward in both psychol-
ogy and economics. For example, attraction and compromise effects are attributed to
loss aversion in the Leaking Competing Accumulators model (Usher and McClelland,
2004) or attention switching and mutual inhibition occurring between choice options
in Multialternative Decision Field Theory (Roe et al., 2001). Bhatia (2013) proposes
a model in which the accessibility of attributes is determined by the attributes’ associ-
ations with objects of potential choice. More accessible attributes in turn carry higher
weight in an evidence accumulation process. These models, among others, can all ac-
count for the three key context effects. However, in all cases the similarity effect does
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not arise for the same reason as the attraction and compromise effects. In Bhatia’s
model for example, the three effects can occur simultaneously but will not do so un-
der all parameter settings. In the Multiattribute Linear Ballistic Accumulator model
(Trueblood et al., 2014), the attraction and compromise effects arise because objects
that are closer to each other receive larger attention weightings, whereas the similarity
effect occurs when confirmatory evidence is given more weight than disconfirmatory
evidence. Models developed within economics also do not offer an account of all three
effects (e.g., Kamenica, 2008).
Here we offer an alternative approach, aiming to provide a unifying account in
which all three context effects emerge from the same mechanism without the need for
separate parameters. Our model has one free parameter to be estimated: the number of
comparator items brought to mind.
Our approach is rooted in and brings together various approaches within cognitive
science, consumer psychology and economics. In economics, some recent theoretical
approaches have been developed to show how choice behavior can be explained by cog-
nitive limitations such as binary ordinal comparison (e.g., Kornienko, 2013), memory
limitations (Mullainathan, 2002), psychological salience (Bordalo et al., 2012, 2013)
or as optimal responses to noise (e.g., Robson, 2001; Steiner and Stewart, 2014). Our
approach falls within this tradition and also draws on information-sampling models of
judgment, most of which assume that judgments are typically made on the basis of lim-
ited samples (e.g., Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler and Juslin, 2006; Fiedler and Kareev, 2006;
Lindskog et al., 2013). Relevant alternatives are assumed typically to be retrieved from
memory as well as, or instead of, being sampled from the choice context (for a related
approach within economics, see Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010). A direct precursor of
our work within psychology is the Decision by Sampling model (DbS: Stewart et al.,
2006, 2015); we return to this below.
Finally, recent work within psychology emphasizes that estimates of relevant back-
ground distributions and samples may themselves be influenced by choice options (e.g.,
Sher and McKenzie, 2014). Within economics, recent models accommodate the fact
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that available choice options convey relevant information about the market (e.g., Ka-
menica, 2008). Within consumer psychology, it has also been suggested that people take
available choice options as informative about the marketplace. For example, a large per-
son will likely (and wisely) choose a sweatshirt size near the top of the available range
of size options (Prelec et al., 1997; Simonson, 2008; Wernerfelt, 1995). Primes that
change individuals’ estimate of their own ranked position within the population may
similarly change their choice of product: Individuals given easier golf putting tasks
subsequently chose higher-level golfing equipment (Gershoff and Burson, 2011). More
generally, the idea that people update their estimates about attribute values on the basis
of experimentally-provided options has received traction in cognitive psychology. This
idea has been used to explain preference reversals (Sher and McKenzie, 2014), context
effects of the type discussed in the present paper (Shenoy and Yu (2013)), effects of dis-
tribution skew on judgments (Brown et al., 2015b) and anchoring effects (Brown et al.,
2015a). Next, we describe how MADS builds on these various approaches.
4. Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling
Before defining the model formally, we first provide an intuitive introduction to the
model. Following the formal definition, we give a simple graphical illustration of how
the model accounts for the attraction, similarity and compromise effects.
In Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling, the evaluation of an alternative x is based
on how it fares relative to comparators in the mental choice context. More precisely, we
consider x’s value to be determined by its position within the cumulative distribution of
alternatives inferred following exposure to a choice set. By definition, the cumulative
distribution gives the proportion of alternatives which x dominates, ranging between 0
and 1. This gives a simple measure of the relative position of x. The conceptualization
of the value of an item being determined by its location in the market distribution as
measured by its CDF position is intimately related to the fundamental notion that con-
sumers prefer items more if they considered more of a bargain. Indeed if the degree to
which an item is considered a bargain is defined as how many other items in the market
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it is unambiguously better than, then this is exactly our notion of value.
In process terms, we assume that individuals bring to mind n > 0 comparators
through recall or inference about the product space. Individuals then use these com-
parators to estimate an alternative’s CDF value by counting the number of comparison
items it dominates. We assume the alternative with the highest such value is chosen.
Note that because the set of comparison items is finite, whether we use counts or pro-
portions for value is irrelevant for selecting the highest-value item. We use counts
throughout the paper, but note that as n → ∞, it is the proportion (i.e., count divided
by n) which approaches x’s position in the inferred cumulative distribution.
To illustrate the choice procedure consider an alternative x in choice set X . It ac-
cumulates a score (or count) s(x) based on how many alternatives in the comparison
sample (and other alternatives in the choice set) it dominates. For example, consider
hotel stays differing in price and quality. If the choice set is {A,B} = {($100, 4.0),
($200, 4.5)} and one other hotel is brought to mind with attributes ($250, 4.2), then
s(A) = 0, s(B) = 1, and B is chosen.
We now offer a fuller example to highlight the role of the inferred distribution.
Consider options A and B in Figure 2. Each of the n comparison items increases the
probability of choosing A, the probability of choosing B, or neither. The effect of a
comparator will depend on where in the price × quality space it falls. Consider the
regions marked RA, RB, and RAB. RB is the dominance region exclusive to option B,
which we refer to as B’s ‘solo-dominance region’. Any item that falls within RB is
more expensive than both A and B, lower quality than B, and higher quality than A.
Thus B dominates (i.e., is better than on both attributes) any item in RB. Items in RB
are more expensive but also higher quality than option A, so they are not dominated by
A. Similarly, comparison items that fall in RA are dominated exclusively by A because
they are only more expensive and lower quality than A. Finally, items that fall in RAB
are dominated by both A and B (i.e., in RAB items are both more expensive and of
lower quality than both A and B). MADS assumes that choice is determined by how
many comparison items fall into each of these regions. The distribution from which
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comparison items are drawn will therefore affect whether A orB is chosen. The shaded
area in Figure 2 represents such a distribution. A larger portion of the shaded area falls
into RA than RB, meaning that A is more likely to be chosen.
Because of the probabilistic nature of the sampling process, A will not always be
chosen, especially if the comparison sample is small, leading to a stochastic element of
choice in our model.
Figure 2: Multi-Attribute Decision by Sampling
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For ease of exposition, assume that the gray area
corresponds to a uniform-height density which in-
tegrates to one. As lower prices and higher quality
are preferred, a point is dominated if it lies to the
south-east of another.
More generally, MADS assumes that an alternative accrues a point when an item
falls in its solo-dominance region. For items in a joint-dominance region, a point ac-
crues to any of the dominating alternatives’ scores with equal probability. Therefore,
if there are no dominance relations between the alternatives in the choice set, the al-
ternative with the highest probability of accumulating a point is also the most likely to
be chosen. The model provides analytic expressions for the probabilities of choosing
each alternative from a choice set.2 As such, given the choice set, the number of com-
parators n and the inferred distribution, one can compute the probability of each choice
alternative being chosen.
2See Appendix B for details.
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The Model
MADS describes two stages of processing. In the first stage, an sample is generated.
Each alternative is J−dimensional, where x = (x1, ..., xJ) describes the level of each
attribute of alternative x. Each x ∈ X is referred to as a ‘choice alternative’, and X
the ‘choice set’. Given X , the individual then infers a J−dimensional distribution or
‘inferred distribution’ over the product space, with CDF denoted FX . n > 0 draws are
made from FX . We assume draws are independently and identically distributed for the
purposes of this paper. The set of draws sampled is denoted W where a typical element
is w = (w1, ..., wJ) ∈ W .
In the second stage, a score for each choice alternative is determined and a choice
is made. The score of an alternative x is constructed via ordinal binary comparisons of
the attribute levels against the other items in the ‘reference set’ X ∪W \ x. Elements
of this set are referred to as ‘comparators’ or ‘comparison items’. A choice alternative
accrues a point when it is compared to an item in the reference set that it dominates.
The choice alternative with the highest total score is then chosen. To represent this
explicitly, let %j be the rational binary preference relation which an individual has over
levels of the attributes j = 1, . . . , J over any two items. Therefore x dominates y if
x %j y for j = 1, . . . , J . In the case of hotels, where the attributes are price (p) and
rating (q), both preference relations are assumed monotonic: x %p y ⇐⇒ xp ≤ yp and
x %q y ⇐⇒ xq ≥ yq. Given the reference set, the choice correspondence c : X 7→ X
can be expressed as:
c(X) ∈ arg max
x∈X
{s(x)}
where,
s(x) = |{w ∈ W ∪X : A(w) = x}|
A(w) =

one member of DX(w), selected with probability 1|DX(w)| if DX(w) 6= ∅
∅ else
DX(w) = {x ∈ X \ w : x %j w, j = 1, . . . , J}
If c(X) is a singleton, then this item is chosen. If it contains more than one element,
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then each element of the set is chosen with equal probability. In this notation, DX(w) is
the set of choice alternatives in X that dominate w (excluding comparison with itself),
A(w) is the alternative that accumulates a point from comparison item w, and s(x) is
the total score accumulated for each choice alternative.
Explaining Context Effects
We now provide an intuitive description of how the model captures each of the three
context effects. As an accompaniment, we provide a statement of sufficient conditions
on the inferred distributions for MADS to yield each context effect in Appendix B.
Attraction Effect
An illustration of how the inferred distribution may reasonably depend on the at-
traction effect choice sets is given by Figure 3. The triangular nature of the attraction
effect choice sets pulls more of the density (shaded area) of the inferred distribution to
the target’s dominance region. This increases the probability that comparison items are
drawn from the target’s dominance region. This will tend to increase the score accumu-
lated by the target relative to the non-target alternative, and hence the probability of it
being chosen. Furthermore, attraction effect choice sets include a dominated alternative
which gives the target alternative a head-start in the accumulation of points.
Figure 3: Attraction effect
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Compromise Effect
The intuition behind the explanation is illustrated by Figure 4. It is reasonable
to suggest that the central parts of individuals’ inferred distributions are wider. This
ensures that more density is in the dominance region of the central (target) alternative.
When the shift in the choice set is accompanied by a corresponding shift of the inferred
distribution as shown, the central alternative remains the most popular: the compromise
effect occurs. In fact, the compromise effect is the only one of the three for which our
model requires a shift in the inferred distribution across choice sets.
Figure 4: Compromise effect
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Similarity Effect
The intuition is illustrated by Figure 5. The similarity effect is driven by the fact
that the non-target alternative is forced to share its solo-dominance region with the
decoy. On the other hand, the target alternative is left with a relatively large solo-
dominance region. When the decoy switches to be close to the other alternative, so that
the non-target becomes the target, these forces reverse, causing the similarity effect.
As the decoy becomes more similar to the non-target, this force is stronger, and the
similarity effect larger. Conversely, as the decoy moves further away and towards the
center, the choice sets will become the same (resembling a compromise choice set), and
accordingly we would predict no difference in choice proportions.
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Figure 5: Similarity effect
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5. Experiments
We conducted two experiments to test MADS. Experiment 1 tested whether choice,
and hence context effects, can be manipulated in accordance with our model’s predic-
tions. Experiment 2 tests the prediction that the inferred distribution will depend on the
choice set and allows us to estimate the parameter n.
Hotel Price and Quality Data
Choice alternatives for the experiments were Manhattan hotel stays, for which there
are two main attributes: ‘average rating’ and ‘price’. Data pertaining to real hotels were
taken from Hotels.com on 23 June 2014. We recorded the price and average rating of the
cheapest 200 hotel stays for a one-night stay for one adult in one room, for a stay on 12
November 2014.3 ‘Average rating’ refers to the rating given by members of Hotels.com
who had previously stayed at the hotel.4 We presented the score rounded to one decimal
place, as it is presented on the website itself. This served as our proxy for quality, so
that we could present data across the price-quality domain, as in classical context-effect
experiments. Given the familiarity of such sites to internet users, we referred to ‘average
rating’ rather than ‘quality’ throughout the experiment. 12 distinct hotels were selected
from these data to form the six choice sets of the three context effects.5 As with most
3See Figure A1 in Appendix A for a plot of the hotel data recorded.
4Each reviewer submits a score of 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, where higher numbers correspond to a better
experience. All the hotels we recorded had at least 25 reviews.
5Details of the choice sets used can be found in Table A1.
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studies showing the presence of these context effects, participants’ hotel choices were
hypothetical.
Study 1: Choice Manipulation
Method
1,304 Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers were recruited in July 2014.6 68
were excluded from the analysis because they had previously completed a related pi-
lot study; one was removed because they did not complete the experiment. This left
data from 1,235 participants for analysis. Average completion time was 14 minutes 27
seconds. Participants were compensated with a participation fee of $1.50, which cor-
responds to an average hourly wage of $6.23. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of 12 conditions = 3 [attraction, compromise, similarity] ×2 [A target, B target]
= 6 choice sets ×2 conditions [treatment, control].
Participants in the treatment condition each saw data relating to ten hotels taken
from the dataset before selecting an alternative from one of the six choice sets. They
were shown the price and average rating of each of these ten hotels one at a time, and for
each one were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale how likely they would be to stay
at the hotel. The purpose of asking this was to ensure some amount of engagement with
the hotels presented, such that they would affect the hotels available in the participants’
comparison sample. An example screen-shot is provided in Figure 6. Following the
treatment, participants faced one of the choice sets and answered the question “Which
hotel would you be most likely to choose?”. Participants in the control condition simply
chose without seeing any other hotels first. Before finishing, participants faced a series
of questions for another experiment. Participants were then asked to indicate how they
divided their attention when considering hotel choices using a seven-point scale where
1 meant “considered solely prices”, 4 meant “both attributes equally”, and 7 “solely
ratings”. Basic demographic questions followed on the final screen.
6The rationale for this sample size is given in Appendix A
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Figure 6: Screen-shot of manipulation
Note that the slider was not visible until the participant clicked on the scale.
The ten hotels shown as a treatment were chosen such that they were dominated
by alternative B (the more expensive, higher-quality alternative), but not dominated by
alternative A (the cheaper, lower-quality alternative), in the choice set they faced after-
wards. Because the hotels in each context effect choice set were different, a different
set of hotels were used as a manipulation for each choice set. Where there were more
than ten candidate hotels fitting this description, ten were chosen at random. Every
participant in the same choice set saw the same ten hotels, but in a random order. The
manipulation is described by Figure 7. Notice that in the attraction and compromise
choice sets, only alternative B is promoted. In the similarity set including a decoy close
to B, both B and the decoy are promoted, because they are close together. We now
refer to the target alternatives in general as the ‘manipulation targets’.
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Figure 7: Manipulating choice: method
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Participants saw ten hotels (crosses) in a random order prior to facing a ternary choice set: A
and B plus one of the decoys (unfilled circles). Notice that in the attraction and compromise
choice sets, only alternative B is promoted. In the similarity set including a decoy close to B,
both B and the decoy are promoted, because they are so close together.
Results
The treatment effect is the difference in the proportion of participants choosing the
manipulation targets in the treatment and control conditions. Overall, participants chose
the manipulation targets 7% more often as a result of the treatment (p < .001).
Our theory supposes that this manipulation will be successful because the hotels that
participants were shown are dominated by the manipulation targets on both attributes,
but by the other alternatives in the choice set on only one attribute. Therefore, we
expect to the manipulation to have the most impact when individuals pay attention to
both attributes. Table 1 shows large differences in manipulation effect depending on
whether or not participants paid attention to both attributes equally. The majority of
participants paid attention to both attributes equally. The effect of the treatment on
these participants was 17% (p < .001), but was zero for those reporting that they paid
attention unequally.
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Table 1: Manipulating choice.
Attribute attention Observations χ2 statistic Manipulation effect
All (1-7) 1,235 9,397,860 .07***
Equal (4) 632 1,286,446 .17***
Non-equal (1-3, 5-7) 603 0.17 .01***
Attribute attention: sliding scale of integers {1, ..., 7} where 1=only considered price, 4=considered
both attributes equally, 7=only considered quality. Manipulation effect: the difference in the percent-
age of participants choosing the manipulation targets in the treatment and control conditions. ***
denotes a significant difference from zero, where p < .001 from χ2 tests against the null of no effect.
No star denotes p = .681.
Our theory is focused on dominance on all attributes. The manipulations had a
significant and large impact on the choice for those paying equal attention to both at-
tributes. For those not doing so, no effect was found. We therefore continue the analysis
using the data from those who reported paying equal attention.7
Our design permits us to attempt to counter and enhance the three context effects.
For example, the attraction effect says that alternative B will be chosen more often
from {A,B, TB} than {A,B, TA}, with no manipulation. When participants choosing
from {A,B, TA} are instead in the treatment condition, we predict that B will be more
popular than if they were not. Therefore, when we compare choices from participants
who faced {A,B, TB} in the control and {A,B, TA} in the treatment group, we predict
that the attraction effect will be reduced. This example corresponds to the first column
in Figure 8. The remaining columns describe which data from which conditions are
compared to investigate the impact on the context effects.
7See Figure A2 for the results including all participants.
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Figure 8: Manipulating context effects: method.
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In the left (right) three columns, we predict that context effects will be countered (enhanced) due to the
manipulation. Choice sets are shown as solid circles and the hotels of the manipulation as crosses. Price
is on the x-axis, average rating on the y-axis.
We know from Table 1 that the manipulations had a significant impact on choices.
The manipulation effect is still significant when broken down by context effect (all three
χ2 tests give p < .001). Figure 9 shows how choice manipulations in turn affected the
presence and strength of the attraction, compromise and similarity effects.
Figure 9: Manipulating context effects: evidence.
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Context effect size is the difference in the choice proportions of alternative B. (C) denotes
countering and (E) enhancing where the choice data used for each are depicted in the columns
of Figure 8; (N) denotes ‘neutral’, which refers to the standard attempt to replicate the context
effects. Standard error bars are given. Solid circles refer to a significant context effect i.e., dif-
ferent from zero, at the 5% level from a standard χ2 test. Hollow circles refer to no significant
difference from zero, and hence no context effect.
The attraction effect was replicated with an effect of .34, significantly different from
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zero.8, 9 When we enhanced the context effect through our manipulation, the effect size
almost doubled, to .65. When we countered the effect, the effect fell to .07, which
is insignificantly different from zero. In other words, the attraction effect was turned
off. The compromise effect was .38, significantly different from zero. Countering the
compromise effect reduced it to .31 and enhancing lifted it to .43.
The similarity effect was not replicated, with an effect insignificantly different from
zero. Our theory dictates that the presence of context effects are probabilistic and we
are not the first study to find that the similarity effect is the weakest (e.g., Noguchi and
Stewart, 2014).10 More importantly, our manipulations did have an effect. Countering
the similarity effect pushed the size down to -.15, which is marginally significant (p =
.07), which shows some evidence of reversing the effect. When we enhanced the effect,
the size became .20, which is significantly different from zero. In other words, the
similarity effect was turned on.
Study 2: Distribution Elicitation
Method
607 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers were recruited. The participants of study 2
were also the control group for study 1. Following their choice, and hence exposure to
a choice set, we elicited what participants inferred about the rest of the hotel market. It
would have been prohibitive to ask them for their best guess of all the other 197 hotels
in our dataset. Instead we asked them to estimate the price and quality of a randomly
chosen 20. They were told that 20 hotels had been randomly selected from our dataset,
which they had to estimate. These 20 did not include the three they had already seen in
their choice set. Participants were able to see their choice set throughout the elicitation
8An effect of .34 means that 34% more people chose B from {A,B, TB} than from {A,B, TA}.
9Recent work has investigated and debated the domains in which the attraction effect can be expected
to appear (Frederick et al., 2014; Huber et al., 2014; Simonson, 2014; Yang and Lynn, 2014). This work
suggests that pictorial and verbal (rather than numerical) descriptions of choice alternatives can dampen
or nullify the attraction effect. Although it is important to recognize the boundaries under which an effect
is expected, quality (in addition to price) is often represented by a numerical value, especially in the
modern online marketplace.
10Note that when we looked at individuals’ inferred distributions we did not significantly predict
choice in the similarity effect conditions, but did in the attraction and compromise effect conditions (see
the estimation section).
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process, but not to change their choice.
To elicit their estimation of the market distribution, they completed two screens. On
the second screen, we asked participants to plot where they thought these 20 hotels lay
in price×rating space, based on the choice set they had seen. That is, they were shown
their choice set plotted on a pair of axes and required to plot where they thought the
20 additional hotels were located. An example screen-capture is provided in Figure 10.
The example participant shown chose from a similarity effect choice set, {A,B, SA},
which typically promotes the cheapest option A (labeled here for the benefit of the
reader). The participant has placed nine plots so far. The choice set was displayed in
red; plots in green. To avoid possible anchoring effects, we did not include grid lines,
axis ticks or axis-tick labels. To scale the axes, we asked for their best guess of the
minimum and maximum price and average rating of the 23 hotels (including the choice
set they faced). The minimum and maximum value of each axis was determined by
participants themselves on the first screen, which they could not return to. Illogical
answers e.g., that the minimum was higher than the maximum, were not allowed. The
on-screen size of the plotter was fixed to be a square; participants only determined
scale of the axes. Participants were able to see the coordinates where their mouse was
hovering, were able to reset the graph and were provided with a counter telling them
how many points they still had to place.
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Figure 10: Screen-capture of distribution elicitation.
We did not allow participants to go back to change the minimum and maximum
values for the axes due to concerns that participants would tweak their answers to move
their choice set around the plotter. We removed data of participants who entered values
extreme enough such that the choice set would be shown bunched into the corner of the
screen.11 We chose the cutoff to be a price of $800; anyone entering this value or higher
was excluded. This removed 35 participants, leaving 572 for analysis.
As an incentive payment, participants were told that the five who plotted closest
to the 20 hotels would be paid $5 as a bonus. The procedure we used to determine
who was the closest was that according to the modified-Hausdorff metric, as advocated
by Dubuisson and Jain (1994). This metric provides a distance based on the average
minimum pairwise distances between two sets of coordinates. In our case, these two
sets were the participant’s plotted data, and the 20 hotels randomly chosen.12
11Confirming this concern, we were in fact contacted by one participant who had entered a maximum
price of $5,000, who wanted to explain his choice to us.
12Participants were not told the details of the metric; they were simply told that the five plots ‘closest’
to the 20 we had would be paid.
74
Results
Distribution Elicitation
Each panel of Figure 11 presents the pooled plots placed by all ≈100 participants
per choice set, meaning there are roughly 2,000 plots in each panel. We provide the
proportions of plots contained within the crucial areas identified by theory. We draw on
patterns in these aggregate data which illustrate how choice sets affect distributions, and
that these distributions move in ways compatible with our theory to produce the context
effects. We discuss features of this aggregate distribution data as if it were in fact the
distribution of all individuals in order to demonstrate how we consider context effects
can arise. Recall that MADS supposes that movements in the inferred distributions
change the probabilities of alternatives being included in the comparison set, and hence
affect choice probabilities. Specifically, if there are no dominance relations between the
alternatives in the choice set, the alternative with the highest probability of accumulating
a point is also the most likely to be chosen.
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Figure 11: Plotting data by choice set and aggregate-PDF values.
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Lighter colors refer to a higher density of plots. The numbers refer to the proportion of points plotted
in that region i.e., the empirical density. Graphics are cropped at 2/5 for quality, and $500; over 95%
of the plotting data is in this range.
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Inspection of the heat-maps reveals pronounced movement of the density of the plot-
ted points between choice sets. Using a multi-dimensional version of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, as proposed by Fasano and Franceschini (1987) we found that within each
of the three context effects the distributions elicited from participants differed signifi-
cantly (p < .001) depending on which choice set they had seen.
The attraction effect panels show that the total density of the solo-dominance regions
is .40 in both conditions. .05 of the density shifts from A’s dominance region when A
is the target to B’s dominance region when B is the target. The shift in density towards
the target, and the fact that the target enjoys a 1-0 head-start in the score accumulation
from the decoy, combine to predict the attraction effect.
In the compromise effect panels, .06 of the density is inB’s dominance region under
{A,B,CA} and .032 = .015 in the region dominated by bothB and the decoy. This gives
the probability of B accumulating a point as approximately .075. When B becomes the
target, the probability ofB accumulating a point is approximately .095, a 27% increase.
ForA, the corresponding numbers are .08 and .095, a 19% increase when it is the target.
The movements in density are consistent with the MADS account of the compromise
effect.
In the similarity effect panels, B has a negligibly small solo-dominance region be-
cause it is similar to the decoy and .10 of the density is dominated by both. The narrow
regions all have less than .03 density and are ignored for this discussion. Accordingly,
B has approximately .05 probability of accumulating a point. When B becomes the
target, the same area of price×quality space is dominated only by B. The probability
of B accumulating a point under {A,B, SB} is approximately .12. This illustrates how
MADS explains the similarity effect.
Estimation
Finally, despite the small sample size per participant, we examined whether it was
possible to predict individuals’ choices. Our model imposes no assumptions or parame-
ters on an individual’s inferred distribution. Only 20 plots per participant are available,
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so individual empirical distributions are too coarse to enable prediction. Therefore, we
selected the multi-variate distribution that best-fitted each participant’s plots (i.e., selec-
tion was independent of the choice data). Various copulas (Gaussian, t, Frank, Gumbel
and Clayton) were fitted to each participant’s estimate of the distribution of 23 points
(20 plotted and 3 from their choice set). (Copulas are succinct descriptions of the cor-
relation between two variables.) Copula selection for each participant was determined
by the Akaike Information Criterion.
For each participant we determined the choice that was most likely on the basis of
that participant’s estimated inferred distribution. The proportion of correct predictions
is reported in Table 2. It can be seen that the choices were reasonably well predicted
for participants in the attraction and compromise conditions but not in the similarity
condition. These findings are congruent with the fact that we replicated the attraction
and compromise effects but not the similarity effect, as shown in Figure 9.
Table 2: Predicting individuals’ choices.
Context effect Observations Null Predicted p-value
Attraction 194 .50 .62 .001
Compromise 180 .33 .42 .014
Similarity 198 .33 .30 .327
The null hypotheses are those implied by random prediction between all non-
dominated choice alternatives. p-values are from two-sided binomial tests.
To compute the estimates of Table 2, we first estimated the MADS parameter n that
specifies the number of comparison items brought to mind from individuals’ inferred
distributions. We calculated the probability of participants’ choice data for different
values of n and found the maximum likelihood estimate to be 4.13 The estimate is
precise in the sense that it is significantly different from both 3 and 5 (LR tests p = .021
and p = .091 respectively). Note that n = 4 is a psychologically realistic value for
13Three participants chose the decoy alternative from attraction effect choice sets and were excluded
from the estimation, leaving 569 participants. Our model has no additional error term and so predicts
such behavior with probability zero, which prevents the likelihood from being well-defined.
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working memory capacity (see Cowan, 2001), consistent with the idea that comparison
samples are held in working memory during choice.
6. Discussion
MADS offers a single-mechanism model of the attraction, compromise and similar-
ity effects. In Experiment 1, prior exposure to a distribution of market options altered
subsequent choices in ways predicted by the model, and allowed us to remove and en-
hance the classic context effects. This result, consistent with recent studies of risky
choice (e.g., Stewart et al., 2015, Ungemach et al., 2011) but here pertaining to the
“big three” context effects, suggests that assumptions about background distributions,
combined with choices made on the basis of simple dominance relations, may give rise
to context effects. Experiment 2 demonstrated that individuals’ inferred distributions of
market options depend on the choice set in ways required by the model, thus extending
and applying previous studies within the “options as information” tradition (e.g., Sher
and McKenzie, 2014, Shenoy and Yu, 2013, Kamenica, 2008). Moreover, the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator of the model’s central parameter took on a psychologically
realistic value for the capacity of human working memory.
Our data was generated by members of Amazon’s online platform, Mechanical Turk
(AMT). AMT’s online population has been shown to have the advantages of being more
demographically diverse, and producing data of the same, if not better, quality than
more traditional participant methods (Paolacci and Chandler, 2014; Chandler et al.,
2014). This has been shown through many studies replicating classic experiments in
various domains including cognitive psychology (e.g., Paolacci et al., 2010, Goodman
et al., 2013) and economics (e.g., Horton et al., 2011). Some have expressed concern
that AMT participants may not pay sufficient attention to the choice alternatives which
may lead to a failure to find the attraction effect (Simonson, 2014). We demonstrate that
the classic context effects in consumer choice can be found with such samples, and are
the first to our knowledge to demonstrate the presence of all three (where the similarity
effect was found only after the treatment).
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Our modeling approach contrasts with existing models of these context effects in
that it does not assume value-like encoding of stimulus attributes (albeit values modified
by attentional weights, availability, etc). Vlaev et al. (2011) distinguish between three
broad classes of model: those that assume the computation of different options’ values
(which then inform choice directly); those that assume value computation modified by
context, and “comparison-only” models in which choices depend directly on (typically
ordinal-only) comparisons without involving any computation of value. Our model is
an example of the third, comparison-only, category of model.
More specifically, it can be seen as an extension of rank-based models such as De-
cision by Sampling (Stewart et al., 2006) and, more generally, sampling models that
assume that options are evaluated relative to an assumed background distribution (see
also Kornienko, 2013). According to DbS, judgments result from a series of binary
ordinal comparisons of a to-be-judged target against other values in a mental sample.
DbS emphasizes the role of comparison items retrieved from memory. For example,
consider evaluating a hotel price of $200 per night. DbS suggests that a sample of other
hotel prices would be brought to mind. These could be remembered prices paid in the
past, and/or other prices visible on a hotel comparison website. If the mental sample
contained two hotel prices below $200, and five higher prices, the subjective judgment
of the $200 price would be determined by its relative rank position in the context, i.e.,
5
7
. An implication is that different mental samples (reflecting differences in individuals
beliefs about hotel prices elsewhere) would lead to different judgments about the same
actual price. MADS both extends DbS to the two-dimensional case (see also Stewart
and Simpson, 2008), and specifies the role of choice options in causing the background
distribution to be updated.
In economics, the classical economic decision-maker is assumed to be able to ef-
fortlessly make trade-offs across multiple dimensions. Recently, work has focused on
equilibrium in markets when consumers exhibit some degree of trade-off aversion, em-
ploying some heuristic instead (e.g., Bachi and Spiegler, 2015; Papi, 2014). In partic-
ular, Bachi and Spiegler (2015) study two-attribute goods and assume that a dominant
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alternative is chosen when it exists.
More generally, much experimental evidence is consistent with the idea that the
ranked position of an item within an experimental context will influence its judgment.
Evidence came initially from psychophysics (Parducci et al., 1960; Parducci and Per-
rett, 1971) but has since been found in subjective judgments of sweetness (Riskey et al.,
1979), morality (Marsh and Parducci, 1978), body image (Wedell et al., 2005), attrac-
tiveness (Wedell et al., 1987), fairness (Mellers, 1982), personality (Wood et al., 2012),
and prices (Niedrich et al., 2001; Niedrich et al., 2009). More recently, rank-based and
range-frequency theory principles have been used to understand sensitivity to human
fatalities (Olivola and Sagara, 2009), individuals’ satisfaction with both their wages
(Brown et al., 2008) and their life in general (Boyce et al., 2010; Smith et al., 1989).
Our approach is therefore consistent with range of evidence for rank-based pro-
cesses in various areas of psychology. Moreover, individual differences in beliefs about
background distributions influence judgment. For example, individuals’ beliefs about
whether they are drinking too much or exercising enough depend not just on their ob-
jective behavior (e.g., the number of days per week they exercise; the amount of alcohol
they consume) but on how they believe their symptoms rank within the general popu-
lation (i.e., how many people out of 100 they believe drink or exercise more than they
do) (Maltby et al., 2012; Wood et al., 2012). Beliefs about the relevant background
distributions also predict people’s judgments of whether they are depressed or anxious
(Melrose et al., 2013), students’ satisfaction with their educational experience (Brown
et al., 2015b) and attitudes towards indebtedness (Aldrovandi et al., 2014), and indi-
viduals’ attitudes towards dishonest behavior (Aldrovandi et al., 2013). In summary,
MADS not only provides a one-parameter account of the “big three” context effects; it
is also consistent with a wide range of psychological data from other domains.
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Appendix A - Methodological Details
Sample Size
It was decided in advance that 1,200 participants would be tested; 1,300 were re-
quested from AMT in order to be able to remove some if there were those who had
completed a related pilot, and 1,304 were received. There is considerable variation in
the size of context effects in the literature, and they are of course not always found. Es-
timates from studies in consumer choice find sizes ranging from about 0.15 (see Table
1 of Trueblood et al. 2013) to over 0.3 (Noguchi and Stewart 2014). We chose to ensure
100 participants per condition; this gives a power of 0.8 to detect a difference in choice
proportion of 0.2 when comparing two conditions with each other.
Supporting Figures
Figure A1: Hotel data.
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Table A1: Choice sets (price, rating).
Alternative Attraction Compromise Similarity
A 125 3.6 179 3.5 194 3.5
B 249 4.4 233 4.0 239 4.2
DA 159 3.3 130 2.9 231 4.1
DB 278 4.1 287 4.5 199 3.6
Figure A2: Manipulating context effects: evidence (all participants).
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Appendix B - Sufficient Conditions for Context Effects
We now provide sufficient conditions on the inferred distributions for MADS to pre-
dict each of the three context effects. Because the expressions for choice probabilities
are lengthy, we provide sufficient conditions under ‘symmetry’ which provide a cleaner
statement for how the model can generate the effects. Figs. 3-5 from the main text
are counterparts to the Propositions which display distributions that satisfy symmetry.
Proofs are detailed below.
Denote the probability of an inferred comparison item being dominated by an alter-
native x having been presented with choice setX , as FX(x). Furthermore, let F{A,B,DA}
and F{A,B,DB} be denoted by A and B respectively, where DA and DB are the decoys
making A and B the targets respectively, where the exact positioning of the decoy
depends on which context effect is in question. This means for example, that A(B)
refers to the probability of drawing an item which is dominated by B (and not A)
from the inferred distribution induced by {A,B,DA}. For joint dominance regions, we
analogously denote A(A,B) (B(A,B)) as the probability of drawing a n item which
is dominated by both A and B from the inferred distribution induced by {A,B,DA}
({A,B,DB}).
Attraction Effect
Proposition 1 (Attraction). The model produces the attraction effect if:
(i) Symmetry: A(A,B) = B(A,B), A(A) = B(B) and A(B) = B(A).
(ii)
A(A)
A(B)
[
=
B(B)
B(A)
]
> 1.
The first symmetry condition assumes that the probability of sampling an item
which affects the expected scores of A and B by the same amount, is the same. If
this is satisfied, one can focus on the probabilities of items falling in regions that affect
the difference in the scores. The second and third equalities in (i) impose symmetry on
the inferred distributions around A and B, so the explanation can abstract from differ-
ences that may occur because A is cheaper, or B is higher quality. The final statement
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drives our intuition. It states that the probability of an item falling in the solo-dominance
region of the target is greater than of an item falling in the solo-dominance region of
the non-target alternative. This implies it is more likely that the target accumulates a
point. Because the item with the highest score is chosen, these conditions produce the
attraction effect.
Compromise Effect
Proposition 2 (Compromise). The model produces the compromise effect if the follow-
ing are satisfied:
(i) Symmetry: A(A) = B(B), A(B) = A(CA) = B(A) = B(CB), A(A,B) =
A(A,CA) = B(A,B) = B(B,CB) and A(A,B,CA) = B(A,B,CB).
(ii)
A(A) + 1
2
A(A,B) + 1
2
A(A,CA)
B(A) + 1
2
B(A,B)
[
=
B(B) + 1
2
B(A,B) + 1
2
B(B,CB)
A(B) + 1
2
A(A,B)
]
> 1.
Condition (ii) drives the intuition about what is required for the compromise effect.
Due to symmetry, the discussion is the same for both alternatives, so we will just refer
to B. Under symmetry, the condition B(B) + 1
2
B(A,B) + 1
2
B(B,CB) > A(B) +
1
2
A(A,B) implies that the probability of a point being accumulated to B’s score is
higher under {A,B,CB} than {A,B,CA}. Hence under symmetry, (ii) is sufficient
to yield p(B|ABCB) > p(B|ABCA), the compromise effect. Note that if B’s solo-
dominance region is larger when it is the target it helps to produce the effect. Notice
also, that when B is the target, it has two joint-dominance regions, but only one when
it is not the target. This accounts for the presence of an extra joint-dominance region in
the numerator of (ii).
Similarity Effect
Proposition 3 (Similarity). The model produces the similarity effect if the following are
satisfied:
(i) Symmetry: A(A) = B(B), A(B) = B(A), A(SA) = B(SB), A(A, SA) =
B(B, SB), A(B, SA) = B(A, SB) and A(A,B, SA) = B(A,B, SB).
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(ii)
A(A) + 1
2
A(A, SA)
B(A) + 1
2
B(A, SB)
[
=
B(B) + 1
2
B(B, SB)
A(B) + 1
2
A(B, SA)
]
> 1.
Condition (ii) carries the intuition of what is required to produce the similarity ef-
fect. Under symmetry, the conditionB(B)+ 1
2
B(B, SB) > A(B)+
1
2
A(B, SA) implies
that the probability of B accruing a point is higher under {A,B, SB} than {A,B, SA}.
Hence under symmetry, (ii) is sufficient to yield p(B|ABSB) > p(B|ABSA), the simi-
larity effect. By inspection of Figure 5 one can see thatB(B) is likely to be greater than
A(B) due to the configuration of the similarity effect choice sets. Although A(B, SA)
is also likely to be greater than B(B, SB), these joint-dominance regions only have a
probability of 1
2
of adding to B’s score.
Symmetry
The symmetry conditions of Propositions 1-3 suppose that individuals’ inferred dis-
tributions will depend on the relative position of the choice set’s alternatives to each
other, but will otherwise be the same i.e., will not depend on the absolute levels of the
attributes. Symmetry allows for a clear exposition, allowing explanations to rely on
a ratio consisting of a few areas of the inferred distribution’s density. We consider it
a natural benchmark case, especially for markets where individuals have had no prior
experience. In practice, when individuals are assessing items, they will draw not only
on the choice set presented to them, but also on their prior experience or knowledge of
the product. This will also affect their inferred distribution over the product space. For
hotels, if individuals have predominantly had exposure to cheaper, lower quality hotels
than those in the choice sets offered, their inferred distributions will place more weight
on this end of the market, in addition to any inference from the choice sets. This would
cause the distributions to be skewed.
More general conditions which allow for a relaxation of symmetry are still express-
ible analytically, but no longer have the simplicity of those in Propositions 1-3, requiring
conditions quantifying the asymmetry and on n. Where data does not satisfy symme-
try, the full expressions for choice probabilities can be used directly to check when the
context effects are expected.
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Proofs
Recall A and B denote the inferred distributions given choice sets F{A,B,TA} and
F{A,B,TB} respectively. Also recall that we have assumed i.i.d. draws from inferred
distributions. The probability of choosing x from X is denoted p(x|X). In equations,
choice sets are written without braces or commas to save on the width of the text. To
simplify the expressions, instead of using the inferred distribution directly, we use the
probability of a choice alternative accumulating a point relative to other choice alterna-
tives. These are denoted α(x) and β(x) given choice sets {A,B,DA} and {A,B,DB}
respectively. n > 0 is assumed, but in some instances n = 1 would cause a summand
to be invalid, in those cases, the sum is zero.
Proof of Proposition 1:
α(A) = A(A) + 1
2
A(A,B) β(A) = B(A) + 1
2
B(A,B)
α(B) = A(B) + 1
2
A(A,B) β(B) = B(B) + 1
2
B(A,B)
α0 = 1− α(A)− α(B) β0 = 1− β(A)− β(B)
These allow us to write:
p(A|ABTA) =1
2
bn−12 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k + 1, n− 2k − 1
)
α(A)kα(B)k+1(1− α(A)− α(B))n−2k−1
+
n∑
k1=0
min {k1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2(1− α(A)− α(B))n−k1−k2
p(A|ABTB) =1
2
bn−12 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k + 1, n− 2k − 1
)
β(B)kβ(A)k+1(1− β(A)− β(B))n−2k−1
+
n∑
k1=2
min {k1−2,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2(1− β(A)− β(B))n−k1−k2
Denote p and p¯ as a lower bound for p(A|ABTA) and an upper bound for p(A|ABTB)
respectively, hence p > p¯ =⇒ p(A|ABTA) > p(A|ABTB), the attraction effect:
p =
n∑
k1=1
min {k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2(1− α(A)− α(B))n−k1−k2
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p¯ =
n∑
k1=1
min {k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, n− k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2(1− β(A)− β(B))n−k1−k2
so p > p¯ if for k1 > k2:
α(A)k1α(B)k2(1− α(A)− α(B))n−k1−k2 > β(A)k1β(B)k2(1− β(A)− β(B))n−k1−k2
and if A(A) = B(B), A(B) = B(A) and A(A,B) = B(A,B) this simplifies to
[
α(A)
α(B)
]k1−k2 [
=
[
β(B)
β(A)
]k1−k2]
> 1. (B1)
Due to the symmetry conditions, repeating the procedure for p(B|ABTB) and p(B|ABTA)
gives the same expression. When in addition one lets α(A)
α(B)
[
= β(B)
β(A)
]
> 1, (B1) is satis-
fied as k1 > k2. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
α(A) = A(A) + 1
2
(A(A,B) +A(A,CA)) +
1
3
A(A,B,CA)
α(B) = A(B) + 1
2
A(A,B) + 1
3
A(A,B,CA)
α(CA) = A(CA) +
1
2
A(A,CA) +
1
3
A(A,B,CA)
α0 = 1− α(A)− α(B)− α(CA)
β(A) = B(A) + 1
2
B(A,B) + 1
3
B(A,B,CB)
β(B) = B(B) + 1
2
(B(A,B) +B(B,CB)) +
1
3
B(A,B,CB)
β(CB) = B(CB) +
1
2
B(B,CB) +
1
3
B(A,B,CB)
β0 = 1− β(A)− β(B)− β(CB)
These allow us to write:
p(A|ABCA) = 1
3
bn3 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
α(A)kα(B)kα(CA)
kαn−3k0
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k1α(CA)
k2αn−2k1−k20
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+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2α(CA)
k1αn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2α(CA)
k3αn−k1−k2−k30
p(A|ABCB) = 1
3
bn3 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
β(A)kβ(B)kβ(CB)
kβn−3k0
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k1β(CB)
k2βn−2k1−k20
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2β(CB)
k1βn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2β(CB)
k3βn−k1−k2−k30
We make the following symmetry assumptions: A(A) = B(B), A(B) = A(CA) =
B(A) = B(CB), A(A,B) = A(A,CA) = B(A,B) = B(B,CB) and A(A,B,CA) =
B(A,B,CB). Together these imply α(A) = β(B), α(B) = β(A), α(CA) = β(CB)
and α0 = β0. Under these assumptions, notice that p(A|ABCA) > p(A|ABCB) (the
compromise effect) is found if:
[
α(A)
α(B)
]k1−k2 [
=
[
β(B)
β(A)
]k1−k2]
> 1. (B2)
Due to the symmetry conditions, repeating the procedure for p(B|ABCB) and p(B|ABCA)
gives the same expression. Finally, by symmetry,
A(A) + 1
2
A(A,B) + 1
2
A(A,CA)
B(A) + 1
2
B(A,B)
> 1 =⇒ α(A)
α(B)
> 1 =⇒ (B2) holds as k1 > k2. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
α(A) = A(A) + 1
2
A(A, SA) +
1
3
A(A,B, SA)
α(B) = A(B) + 1
2
A(B, SA) +
1
3
A(A,B, SA)
α(SA) = A(SA) +
1
2
(A(A, SA) +A(B, SA)) +
1
3
A(A,B, SA)
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α0 = 1− α(A)− α(B)− α(SA)
β(A) = B(A) + 1
2
B(A, SB) +
1
3
B(A,B, SB)
β(B) = B(B) + 1
2
B(B, SB) +
1
3
B(A,B, SB)
β(SB) = B(SB) +
1
2
(B(A, SB) +B(B, SB)) +
1
3
B(A,B, SB)
β0 = 1− β(A)− β(B)− β(SA)
These allow us to write:
p(A|ABSA) = 1
3
bn3 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
α(A)kα(B)kα(SA)
kαn−3k0
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k1α(SA)
k2αn−2k1−k20
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2α(SA)
k1αn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
α(A)k1α(B)k2α(SA)
k3αn−k1−k2−k30
p(A|ABSB) = 1
3
bn3 c∑
k=0
(
n
k, k, k, n− 3k
)
β(A)kβ(B)kβ(SB)
kβn−3k0
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k1, k2, n− 2k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k1β(SB)
k2βn−2k1−k20
+
1
2
bn2 c∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−2k1−1}∑
k2=0
(
n
k1, k2, k1, n− 2k1 − k2
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2β(SB)
k1βn−2k1−k20
+
n∑
k1=1
min{k1−1,n−k1}∑
k2=0
min{k1−1,n−k1−k2}∑
k3=0
(
n
k1, k2, k3, n− k1 − k2 − k3
)
β(A)k1β(B)k2β(SB)
k3βn−k1−k2−k30
We make the following symmetry assumptions: A(A) = B(B), A(B) = B(A),
A(SA) = B(SB), A(A, SA) = B(B, SB), A(B, SA) = B(A, SB) and A(A,B, SA) =
B(A,B, SB). Together these imply α(A) = β(B), α(B) = β(A), α(SA) = β(SB)
and α0 = β0. Under these assumptions, notice that p(A|ABSA) > p(A|ABSB) (the
similarity effect) is found if:
[
α(A)
α(B)
]k1−k2 [
=
[
β(B)
β(A)
]k1−k2]
> 1. (B3)
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Due to the symmetry conditions, repeating the procedure for p(B|ABSB) and p(B|ABSA)
gives the same expression. Finally, by symmetry,
A(A) + 1
2
A(A, SA)
B(A) + 1
2
B(A, SB)
> 1 =⇒ α(A)
α(B)
> 1 =⇒ (B3) holds as k1 > k2. 
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E-Cigarettes: The Extent and Impact of Complementary
Dual-Use
1. Introduction
As of 2014 there were 466 brands of e-cigarettes with sales of around $7 billion and
rising (Evans, 2015). However, E-cigarettes remain highly controversial (Cork, 2009;
Dreaper, 2014; Fairchild and Bayer, 2015; Tavernise, 2014; The Economist, 2014; Trig-
gle, 2014). Protagonists stress their positive impact on increasing the smoking cessation
rate whereas sceptics express concerns about how they might lead to the renormalisa-
tion of smoking, gateway effects and pose a possible health risk. In lieu of conclusive
long-run studies, some medical surveys and smaller controlled trials have suggested e-
cigarettes containing nicotine can be effective for smoking cessation, and can be more
effective than conventional nicotine replacement therapies (e.g., Brown et al., 2014a;
see Rahman et al., 2015 for a review). Academic research has not been unanimous on
this point however, as shown in recent studies (Al-Delaimy et al., 2015; Cressey, 2014,
2015). Many policy debates and studies have placed a strong emphasis on this benefit
of e-cigarettes (Adriaens et al., 2014; Cahn and Siegel, 2011; Hajek, 2014). However,
many health professionals and organisations remain uncertain about the innovation e.g.,
the World Health Organization (2014) and the American College of Physicians (Crow-
ley, 2015). One area identified by academics (Etter, 2015) and organisations e.g., the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (2014a) and Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) (Clarke, 2015; Furlow, 2015) as particularly pressing for research is
that of dual-use of electronic and traditional cigarettes.
Despite the controversy surrounding the industry, which is typically based on the
uncertainty surrounding the relatively new product and the potential gateway effect on
non-smokers (e.g., Dutra and Glantz, 2014), a vital question informed by an economic
perspective remains largely unexplored: do e-cigarettes represent a true substitute for
cigarette use or are they also perceived as a complementary product? The extent to
which e-cigarettes are substitutes or complements will have significant implications for
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the design and execution of policy.
Instead of simply assuming that e-cigarettes are used by all dual-users as a substi-
tute for regular cigarettes, it is important to consider that they may be complementary
products for some; more specifically, dynamic complements (Berry et al., 2014). Take
for instance someone who smokes regular cigarettes but who is subject to regulation
or social pressure. For example, perhaps they can no longer smoke in their workplace
or in places where they meet and associate with friends or family. This increases the
need to reduce consumption or to consume elsewhere, with the associated inconve-
nience. E-cigarettes may be unregulated and fulfil both the nicotine addiction associ-
ated with cigarette use and some of the social element. A cigarette user now has the
option to smoke regular cigarettes where they can and complement this with the use of
e-cigarettes where it is not possible (or appropriate) to smoke cigarettes.
Notwithstanding other arguments for and against their use, if e-cigarettes were only
adopted as substitutes and increased the cessation rate of smokers, they could increase
the associated health and financial benefits due to lowering regular cigarette consump-
tion. But where e-cigarettes act as complements they could instead blunt regular anti-
smoking regulation and prolong the use of conventional cigarettes.
To tackle these issues we conducted an online survey of US participants and found
that 37% of smokers who use e-cigarettes view them primarily as a complementary
product to traditional cigarettes, rather than a substitute. We also found that 54.8% of
‘substitute types’ described themselves as trying to quit, but only 39.6% of ‘comple-
ment types’. We use these results along with publicly available US data to calibrate a
new cost-benefit analysis of e-cigarettes. Among other results we estimate that comple-
mentarity can reduce the benefits due to e-cigarettes by as much as 57%, or $3.3-4.9bn
p.a., relative to the case with no complementarity.
We also compare the responses of dual-users to those of non-smokers. While 37% of
dual-users view them primarily as a complementary product, only 27% of non-smokers
thought the complementarity motive would be stronger for e-cigarette users. This ‘per-
ception gap’ indeed suggests that many would overestimate the benefits of e-cigarettes.
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In an analysis of the characteristics of dual-users we show that ‘complement types’
are more likely to be using some other cessation method or product. This suggests that
some dual-users may be trying to quit via some other method, while using e-cigarettes
to complement their smoking habit. We also find that men are much more likely use
e-cigarettes as complements than women.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a model to guide our empirical
strategy; Section 3 describes the survey design, implementation and results; Section 4
presents the cost benefit analysis; Section 5 concludes. The Supplementary Appendix
provides the survey transcript.
2. Model
As in any model, what we propose is of course a simplification of reality. Our ap-
proach is directed by an empirical strategy. There are economic and medical aspects
of the smoking problem that are beyond the scope of this paper which we do not in-
corporate e.g., market structure, firm decisions, direct effects of e-cigarettes on health,
etc.
We use a two-period setup to model the individual’s choice problem. There is a unit
mass of individuals who smoke. In the first period individuals choose whether or not
to adopt e-cigarettes. By the second period, they will either have ceased smoking or
not. If they have ceased, they receive a ‘health benefit’ of h. Expected ‘consumption
utility’ is denoted uik when only conventional cigarettes are consumed and u
i
d when both
conventional and electronic cigarettes are consumed. Consumption utility does not just
refer to the physical activity of inhalation, but is intended to have a broader definition to
include the effects of regulation on cigarettes and e-cigarettes, price, etc.1 We assume
that smokers prefer the health benefits from quitting to continuing to be a smoker or
dual-user:
1Regulation is an important and current issue for individuals considering adopting electronic
cigarettes. The decision of whether to consume e-cigarettes cannot be made in isolation of the regu-
latory regime.
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Assumption 1. For each smoker i, the benefit of quitting is greater than the benefit of
continuing to be a smoker or dual-user i.e., h > uik, u
i
d.
Under this assumption, each individual prefers the outcome of quitting than that
of continued smoking. Their decision is whether or not e-cigarette adoption offers the
preferred way to achieve cessation.
Without e-cigarette use, individuals will attempt to quit with probability qk, and con-
ditional on quit-attempt, will successfully quit with probability γk. The cessation rate
for smokers is denoted Qk = qkγk. Individuals face uncertainty about the impact of e-
cigarette adoption. Specifically, each individual is unsure whether for them e-cigarettes
will act as a complement or a substitute for conventional cigarettes. Each individual i
has a probability pic of becoming a complement type, and 1−pic of becoming a substitute
type. Complement and substitute types are permitted to have different probabilities of
attempting to quit (denoted qc and qs), and different probabilities of successfully quit-
ting conditional on an attempt, denoted γc and γs. The cessation rates for these types
are denoted accordingly by Qc = qcγc and Qs = qsγs. To interpret substitute types, we
assume they have a higher chance of quitting:2
Assumption 2. The quit rate for substitute types is highest i.e., Qs > Qc, Qk.
This assumption is later confirmed by the data. In the first period’s decision prob-
lem, the second period’s payoff is weighted by the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). In the first
period, smoker i adopts e-cigarettes if the expected utility from adopting is greater than
not adopting:
uid+δ
[
pic[Qch+ (1−Qc)uid] + (1− pic)[Qsh+ (1−Qs)uid]
] ≥ uik+δ[Qkh+(1−Qk)uik]
pic ≤ p¯ic ≡
(1 + δ)(uid − uik) + δ [Qs(h− uid)−Qk(h− uik)]
δ(Qs −Qc)(h− uid)
(1)
That is, smokers with pic ≤ p¯ic will adopt e-cigarettes and become dual-users, which
determines the dual-use rate, d. The dual-use rate depends on many factors. Importantly
for us, smokers with a higher pic are ceteris paribus less likely to adopt e-cigarettes. Our
2The cessation rate is important ratio in health policy directed towards regulation of smoking and so
it is essential that we place this at the centre of our modelling exercise.
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first empirical task is to establish that there exist smokers with pic > 0.
3 Furthermore,
if society’s goal is to minimise the number of smokers and if e-cigarettes offer a better
chance of cessation, then understanding individual differences in pic is important and
can aid policy design. Our survey enables us to investigate these differences.
The Health Cost Savings of E-cigarettes
The cost savings to society generated by one smoker quitting is denoted B. Without
e-cigarettes, the financial savings from smokers quitting is therefore:
BQk. (2)
If complement types are assumed not to exist, the total financial benefit of e-cigarettes
would be given by:
B [(1− d)Qk + dQs] (3)
where we consider the dual-use rate d to be given as the rate seen in practice. In the
presence of complement types, this expression is instead:
B [(1− d)Qk + d[pcQc + (1− pc)Qs]] (4)
where pc > 0 denotes the proportion of complement types. The difference between
(4) and (2) is the actual benefit of e-cigarettes when complement types are taken into
account. The difference between (4) and (3) is the error in the estimate of the benefit
of e-cigarettes when it is incorrectly assumed that pc = 0. The ratio of the error by the
actual benefit is given by:
pc
[
Qs −Qc
Qs −Qk
]
. (5)
This is the relative reduction in the expected cost savings of e-cigarettes when comple-
mentary use is accounted for. Under Assumption 2, (5) is positive when pc > 0 and is
larger when there are more complement types (pc). It is also larger when complement
types have a lower probability of cessation, Qc. We use our survey results alongside
3Note d > 0 does not trivially imply that there exists i such that pic > 0: d > 0 and p
i
c = 0 for all i
is compatible with (1) because the RHS is negative for individuals where uik is sufficiently large.
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publicly available data to estimate (5) and consider various scenarios for the variables
we cannot estimate. We also use estimates of the financial cost per smoker (B) and the
number of smokers to estimate (5) in absolute (dollar) terms.
3. The Survey
Participants
While the model provides a useful framework, the key issues in this paper need
to be addressed empirically. With this in mind we carried out a survey of attitudes
towards smoking. 2,406 participants completed our survey. The survey took an average
of 4 minutes 24 seconds to complete, for which respondents were compensated with
$0.50, an implied wage of $6.82 per hour. 36 had not heard of e-cigarettes, and so were
removed, this left 2,370 for analysis. They were recruited through a leading online
survey platform, Amazon Mechanical Turk in April 2015.4
The Amazon Mechanical Turk Platform
The platform allows data from a diverse participant pool to be collected at rela-
tively little cost, and as such has become a popular recruitment tool for social science
researchers (Kuziemko et al., 2015; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014). Compared to the
general population, participants recruited through the Mechanical Turk (MTurk) plat-
form tend to be younger, better educated and more likely to be female (Berinsky et al.,
2012; Ipeirotis, 2010; Paolacci et al., 2010; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014). Despite
some demographic differences, the quality of responses has been found to be as reli-
able as that found in controlled laboratory environments across a variety of domains
(Berinsky et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2011). Our survey is simpler than economic or
psychological experiments, and hence we believe even less likely to generate unreliable
data.
Demographic information of the whole sample and of the subsample of dual-users
is provided in Table 1. The age and income of our participants are in line with these
4The survey transcript is given in the Supplementary Appendix.
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existing studies using Amazon’s platform. We did however find a higher proportion of
males (55%) than that typically estimated to be the US MTurk population parameter.
This however is likely explained by the higher prevalence of smoking (CDC, 2011) and
dual-usage (Etter and Eissenberg, 2015) among men who may have been attracted to
the study due to the mention of smoking and e-cigarettes in the study description.
Table 1
Respondent Demographics
All Dual-users
N 2,406 413
Age, mean [s.d.] 34.4 [0.2] 33.2 [0.5]
18-25 546 (23) 94 (23)
26-30 595 (25) 112 (27)
31-40 667 (28) 118 (29)
41-50 317 (13) 60 (15)
51+ 281 (12) 39 (9)
Gender
Male 1,316 (55) 254 (61.5)
Female 1,090 (45) 159 (38.5)
Income $k, mean 51.3 48.2
Notes. Data shown are frequencies (% by column), unless otherwise specified. ‘Dual-
users’ are defined as those who reported: “Yes” to the questions “Have you smoked at
least 100 cigarettes in your entire life?”, “Do you now smoke cigarettes at all, no matter
how regularly?” and “Do you now use e-cigarettes every day, some days, or not at all?”
with either “Every day” or “Some days”. Income is average household pre-tax income,
where we assume midpoints are the average of each income band, and an average of
$150k for the >$100k band.
Design
In the medical literature, some surveys have asked dual e-cigarette and cigarette
users their motivation for using e-cigarettes (e.g., Adkison et al., 2013; Brown et al.,
2014b; Dockrell et al., 2013; Etter and Eissenberg, 2015; Goniewicz et al., 2013; Li
et al., 2015; Tackett et al., 2015; Zhu et al., 2013). However, they simply provide a
list of reasons and allow the respondent to answer each one “yes” or “no”. To under-
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stand the relative importance of the reasons for e-cigarette use, it is necessary to require
respondents to consider a trade-off between their reasons for using e-cigarettes. Here,
a few studies have asked respondents to select the primary reason they started using
e-cigarettes (Goniewicz et al., 2013; Tackett et al., 2015). We however, are the first to
pose the question as a direct trade-off between two fundamental economic motivations
and to provide information on the strength of this trade-off. To assess whether smok-
ers who use e-cigarettes view them as a substitute or a complement, respondents were
asked the question as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Screen-shot of the Substitute or Complement Question
Notes. This question was asked to those who reported ever having used an e-
cigarette. As an example, this shot shows a participant selecting -1.42. Note
that the cursor was centred at 0 when the page loaded to minimise bias and
participants had to actively select a value before they could continue. There
was no time limit for the question and participants could not go back to change
their response once they had confirmed it.
The Extent of Complementary Dual-Use
413 of the 2,406 respondents reported being dual-users of electronic and regular
cigarettes which we define as those who reported: “Yes” to the questions “Have you
smoked at least 100 cigarettes in your entire life?”, “Do you now smoke cigarettes at
all, no matter how regularly?” and “Do you now use e-cigarettes every day, some days,
or not at all?” with either “Every day” or “Some days”. Responses to the question in
Figure 1 are displayed in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Empirical CDF of Responses to the Question of Figure 1
The data reveal that there is a large degree of variation in how users view these
products. Figure 2 shows that 37% selected a point greater than 0 i.e., that they pri-
marily use e-cigarettes as a complementary product. Moreover, 6% felt they were best
described by the point furthest to the right, 5, suggesting that for these smokers, e-
cigarettes are strong complements, dominating any substitution motive. There are then
63% who reported that they were best described by a point less than 0, indicating that
they primarily use e-cigarettes to substitute away from traditional cigarette smoking.
18% felt they were best described by the point furthest to the left, -5, suggesting that
for these smokers, e-cigarettes are strong substitutes. These data show that a majority
of smokers use e-cigarettes primarily to reduce the amount they smoke. However, they
also highlight that a sizable minority of e-cigarette users view them as complementary
to traditional cigarettes.
As reported in the introduction, much public and media sentiment has emphasised
the role of e-cigarettes as helping people quit smoking by acting as substitutes for con-
ventional cigarettes. While our data support that many do indeed predominantly use
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e-cigarettes as substitutes, we have revealed that many in fact, do not. We now present
evidence from our sample of this ‘perception gap’: that non-smokers believe there are
significantly more substitute-type dual-users than there are (see Table 2). Non-smokers
who had not tried e-cigarettes were asked the same question as in Figure 1 with the
wording changed to: “Please indicate which point on the following scale best describes
what you think the reasons are that people use electronic cigarettes”. While 37.3%
of dual-users reported using e-cigarettes primarily as complements to conventional
cigarettes, only 26.8% of non-smokers thought the complementarity motive would be
stronger for e-cigarette users. The difference of over 10% is highly significant [χ2(1),
p < 0.01]. Such a perception gap suggests that many would overestimate the benefits
of e-cigarettes.
Table 2
The Perception Gap
Smoking status Complement Substitute
Non-smokers 26.8% 73.2%
Dual-users 37.3% 62.7%
Notes. There were 843 ‘non-smokers’ who responded “no” to “Have you smoked at
least 100 cigarettes in your entire life?”, “Do you now smoke cigarettes at all, no matter
how regularly?” and “Have you tried electronic cigarettes or “e-cigarettes”, even just
one time?”. The 413 ‘dual-users’ are as defined in the notes of Table 1. The difference
between non-smokers and dual-users is significant: χ2(1), p < 0.01.
We suggest that this perception gap may be due to the early success stories of those
who ceased smoking. In Figure 3, we report a strong relationship between quit-status
and why smokers use e-cigarettes. Ex-smokers who have successfully quit are the most
likely to have used e-cigarettes primarily as substitutes (80%), followed by dual-users
who are trying to quit (70%), and finally by those with no intention of quitting (56%).
109
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
 Substitute (−5) to Complement (5)
CD
F
 
 
ex−smokers, n=175
quitting, n=203
not quitting, n=210
Figure 3. Empirical CDF Decomposed by Quit Status
Notes: ‘ex-smokers’ are those who reported having ceased smoking, but who
have used e-cigarettes; ‘quitting’ are dual-users “currently trying to quit smok-
ing cigarettes”; conversely ‘not quitting’ are dual-users who reported they were
not. The distributions of responses display a clear ordering from left to right
by quit-status: they are ordered by the statistical notion of first-order stochas-
tic dominance. These differences are highly significant (p < 0.01 for all three
pairwise KS tests).
That so many, and especially those who have no intention of quitting, use e-cigarettes
primarily as a complementary product raises two concerns. Firstly, e-cigarettes may al-
low many smokers to continue their addiction to nicotine, and hence also to smoke
regular cigarettes, more easily. Secondly, it suggests that public perception will not
accurately reflect this if it is focused on the success stories of those who have used e-
cigarettes and ceased smoking. It is likely that in the early years of e-cigarette usage the
proportion of substitute users will appear relatively high, but as those desiring to quit
do so, the proportion of smokers using e-cigarettes as a substitute in the long-run will
necessarily be lower than it is now. This means that our finding of 63% from Figure 2
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is likely an upper bound estimate on this proportion.
The Characteristics of Complement Types
We further investigate the differences in the characteristics of individuals who use
e-cigarettes as a complement by the logistic regression results shown in Table 3. Con-
firming the results of Figure 3, we found that those reporting trying to quit are more
likely to be those using e-cigarettes as a substitute (OR = 0.45, p < 0.01). We also
found that if a smoker using e-cigarettes was also using another cessation method or
product, it is much more likely that they use e-cigarettes as a complementary prod-
uct (OR = 2.7, p < 0.01). This suggests that those who are trying to quit via some
other product or method also use e-cigarettes, but do so to complement their smoking
habit. Regarding levels of consumption, we found some evidence that those report-
ing higher e-cigarette usage are slightly more likely to be using them as a substitute
(OR = 0.97, p = 0.05), whereas there was no difference in the quantity of cigarettes
smoked. This does not necessarily mean that those reporting using e-cigarettes as a sub-
stitute are not successful in their attempts; it may well be that they are heavier smokers,
and that e-cigarettes have helped them cut down. It is interesting however that any such
substitution has only reduced their cigarette-consumption level to that of those using
e-cigarettes as complements.
We found that being male is strongly associated with being a complement type (OR
= 6.5, p < 0.01). This may relate to the stylised finding that men tend to engage in
risky behaviour more than women (e.g., Harris et al., 2006). There is no noteworthy
difference across ages, but there is a small age effect by gender. Running separate
regressions for men and women reveals no effect for men by age but that older women
are slightly more likely to be complement types than younger women.5 We found no
relationship between income and the motivation for e-cigarette usage.
5These regressions are available from the authors.
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Table 3
Characteristics of Complementary and Substitutive Dual-Users
Log Odds Odds Ratio
(standard errors) [95% confidence interval]
Quitting -0.866*** 0.451***
(0.231) [0.267, 0.661]
Other Method(s) 1.007*** 2.737***
(0.281) [1.578, 4.746]
E-cigarette Consumption -0.027* 0.974*
(0.014) [0.948, 1.000]
Cigarette Consumption 0.003 1.003
(0.014) [0.976, 1.031]
Gender 1.874*** 6.514***
(0.701) [1.649, 25.725]
Age 0.093 1.097
(0.058) [0.979, 1.229]
Age2 -0.002* 0.998*
(0.001) [0.995, 1.000]
Gender*Age -0.166** 0.847**
(0.077) [0.729, 0.985]
Gender*Age2 0.003* 1.003*
(0.002) [1.000, 1.007]
Income 0.011 1.011
(0.042) [0.931, 1.097]
Constant -1.237** 0.290**
(0.616) [0.087, 0.968]
N 413
Pseudo R2 0.12
Notes. Dependent Variable = 0 if substitute, = 1 if complement. Quitting: response
to “Currently trying to quit smoking cigarettes?” No = 0, Yes = 1; Other Method(s):
response to “Currently using another cessation service or product?” No = 0, Yes = 1;
E-cigarette Consumption: response to “About how many times do you use e-cigarettes
in a typical day?”; Cigarette Consumption: response to “About how many cigarettes do
you smoke in a typical day?”; Gender: Female = 0, Male = 1; Age: was rescaled to
start from zero by subtracting 18; Income: 10 ascending income bands; Opinion: about
how e-cigarettes will affect society on average on a [−5, 5] sliding scale to two decimal
places with labels: −5 = negative effect, 0 = no net effect, 5 = positive effect. Robust
standard errors were used. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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4. Cost Benefit Analysis
We now assess how the opposing motivations of dual-use can affect the financial
cost-benefit analysis of e-cigarettes. After outlining our procedure and findings, we
provide a detailed walk-through of the methodology.
Financial cost-benefit analysis is a typical focus of economists and public health
experts (World Health Organization, 2011; Chaloupka and Warner, 2000). Overwhelm-
ingly, the evidence to date indicates that smoking has a net cost accounted for by health
costs and reduced productivity (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2014b;
Xu et al., 2015). In the United States, 2013 official estimates imply that the annual
net cost of smoking on the economy is approximately 2% of GDP, where each adult
smoker imposes an annual cost on the economy of $6,865 (CDC, 2014; US Department
of Health and Human Services, 2014b; Xu et al., 2015). This represents the benefit
per smoker quitting, B, from our model. If used purely for substitution, e-cigarettes
could have a dramatically positive impact on the economy, which we estimate to be
in the range of $5.7-8.5bn per annum.6 However, if complementary use is ignored,
then the number projected to cease smoking will be biased upwards and the expected
cost-savings of e-cigarettes overestimated. We utilise our survey along with data on
smoking habits to provide a quantification of the possible reduction in financial gains
due to complementary use (see Table 4). We estimate the parameters of our model and
estimate Equation (5). Doing so, we find that the presence of complementary use could
reduce the financial benefit of e-cigarettes by up to 57% relative to the case where one
assumes all e-cigarette users regard them as substitutes.
Our estimates are informed by our survey and available data. The 57% relative loss
in benefits due to complementary use is our primary finding, and is independent of the
number of dual-users (d) and the cost-savings per smoker quitting (B), as can be seen
by inspection of (5). Rather, it depends on the quit-attempt rates and cease probabilities
of those attempting to quit.
6Recall this excludes any potential health costs that might be directly attributable to e-cigarettes (e.g.,
Sussan et al., 2015) or through the gateway effect (e.g., Dutra and Glantz, 2014).
113
In order to estimate the absolute benefit in monetary terms, we need an up-to-date
estimate of the proportion of US smokers who are dual-users. Unfortunately recent
officially-verified US data are not readily available. Our survey estimate (51%) is likely
to be biased upwards because the survey’s description specifically asked for opinions
on smoking and e-cigarette use, attracting dual-users. A 2013 cross-country study (Ad-
kison et al., 2013) found that US former and current tobacco users rates of e-cigarette
current-use, ever-use and awareness were roughly 1.5 times those in the UK. A 2015
study for Great Britain showed the dual-use rate among smokers to be 17.6% (Action on
Smoking and Health, 2015). We therefore consider it reasonable to suppose that the US
dual-use rate is higher than its UK counterpart, and if the same ratio has been preserved,
to be around 26.4%. We suggest that the true current rate is likely to fall between these
two, but could be even higher as e-cigarettes gain in popularity. In Table 4 we report
both the more conservative estimate of 17.6% and the higher estimate of 26.4%, which
yield reductions in benefits due to complementary use of up to $3.3bn and $4.9bn p.a.
respectively.
Methodology
The economic impact assessment we conducted applies standard methodology tak-
ing account the costs of smoking and the benefits associated with cessation of smoking.
The costs of smoking are extensively documented and were discussed in detail in the
Surgeon General’s 50th Anniversary Report (US Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, 2014b).
The CDC estimates that the cost of smoking imposes an annual net cost to the US
economy in region of $289-326 billion for 2013 (CDC, 2014; Xu et al., 2015). To
give conservative values, we utilise the lower bound of this range. The total number of
adult smokers in the US is estimated at 17.8% of the adult population in 2013 (CDC,
2014). According to the CDC (2013) this translates into some 42.1 million smokers.
These data allow us to derive a cost figure per adult smoker of $6,865 per annum. In
terms of our model, this is B. We assume that a person who ceases to smoke saves the
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economy this amount per annum. Hence, e-cigarettes, if they elevate the probability of
cessation, present benefits. However, there are also costs associated with e-cigarettes,
which include, among other things, a possible negative impact upon the probability of
a smoker desiring to quit the habit. This effect is particularly more likely to be acute
among those who treat e-cigarettes as complements to real cigarettes.
The impact e-cigarettes have upon the probability of cessation has not yet been
quantified for the US. However, some, particularly those in the e-cigarette industry,
suggest e-cigarettes are beneficial in this regard, a typical example is provided by the
Quit Smoking Community (2015). By contrast, public health professionals in the US
have generally been cautious with regard to such claims and some recent survey evi-
dence indicates that e-cigarettes make quitting cigarette smoking less likely; which we
agree with in respect of those who regard e-cigarettes as a complement. A recent study
from the American Journal of Public Health (Al-Delaimy et al., 2015) concludes:
“Smokers who have used e-cigarettes may be at increased risk for not be-
ing able to quit smoking. These findings, which need to be confirmed by
longer-term cohort studies, have important policy and regulation implica-
tions regarding the use of e-cigarettes among smokers.”
Our online survey seeks to identify and distinguish between the two types of e-
cigarette user: Substitute types who perceives e-cigarettes as a helpful aid to cessation
and complement types who are likely to treat e-cigarettes as a consumption vehicle that
obviates measures aimed at real cigarettes and thus allows for nicotine dependence to
prevail. In determining how e-cigarettes may impact the probability of cessation we ap-
pealed to detailed survey data collected in England. The Smoking Toolkit Study (STS)
by Smoking in England is a monthly survey of a nationally representative sample of
adults that is designed to provide information about smoking prevalence and behaviour
(also see Brown and West, 2015). Over the last five years or so the study has taken
account of e-cigarettes. The STS is a monthly household survey that has been run-
ning since November 2006 and has accumulated more than 115,000 respondents. Each
month about 1,800 are questioned and of these around 450 on average are smokers.
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Data on e-cigarettes has been collected since the second quarter of 2011.
We analysed data collected in STS surveys and calculated the effect e-cigarettes
have upon the probability of smoking cessation. This was done by making use of STS
reported cessation probabilities. Cessation is a state where an ever-smoker has not
smoked for at least one year. In England in 2011, the cessation rate of smokers was
4.4%, where the cessation probability conditional on attempting to quit in 2011 was
0.116. We assume these figures reflect the position before e-cigarettes became widely
consumed: The prevalence of e-cigarettes at that time among smokers and recent ex-
smokers was less than 3%. Data for 2014 gives the cessation rate at 0.066 and the
probability of cessation conditional on attempting to quit at 0.175. E-cigarette preva-
lence was also higher, at 20.1%. The increase to 0.175 refers to all smokers attempting
to quit. We assume that smokers in England who do not use e-cigarettes, continue as
in the past with the probability 0.116. Given that 29.4% were using e-cigarettes to quit,
one can show that dual-users of cigarettes and e-cigarettes who are attempting to quit
have a 0.317 probability of cessation.
The higher cessation rates in England in 2014 than in 2011 are assumed to be en-
tirely due to e-cigarettes in our analysis. Of course other variables affect cessation,
including the price of cigarettes, which has increased over this period above the rate of
inflation by a considerable margin, while GDP per capita has hardly changed (Office
of National Statistics, 2015; The Statistics Portal, 2015). In addition, policy measures
deterring smoking have changed and generally become more stringent. Legislation in-
troduced in England in July 2007 banning smoking in public places has been strength-
ened in many instances by private initiatives since that date (for details see Smoking in
England, 2015). We therefore likely overstate the impact of e-cigarettes. Our analysis
does not claim to offer an exact absolute value for the effect of e-cigarettes, but rather
demonstrates the possible differences between scenarios.
In 2010 the cessation rate in the US was 0.062 and the probability of cessation
conditional on attempting to quit can be estimated at 0.118 (CDC, 2011). (In terms of
our model, this serves as γk.) We employ this estimate for the probability of cessation
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conditional on attempting to quit for smokers who do not adopt e-cigarettes. We are
unaware of data for the US that would allow us to compute the analogous figure to
0.317 as derived from English data, so we use the English estimate to inform our US
scenarios, as explained below. We note that the estimated probabilities 0.116 and 0.118
are similar, as are smoking prevalence rates; as of 2014 these were 18.5% and 17.8%
respectively (Smoking in England, 2015; CDC, 2014). Furthermore, both countries
exhibit similar anti-smoking measures.
To compute the financial benefit to society of e-cigarettes, we assume that each
smoker ceasing to smoke saves the US economy $6,865 per annum (B). Pre e-cigarettes,
we use the estimated cessation probability conditional on attempting to quit, γk =
0.118, along with the quit-attempt rate qk = 0.524 (CDC, 2011), which gives the actual
quit rate as Qk = 0.118×0.524. The results are shown in row 1 (and 6) of Table 4.
The first post e-cigarette scenario estimates the savings due to e-cigarettes where
it is assumed that all dual-users are in fact substitute (S) types. Our survey found that
51% of smokers are dual-users. However, as discussed earlier, our survey is likely to
have been answered by a high proportion of dual-users, so we consider a dual-use rate
between 17.6-26.4% more plausible. Our survey also found that S-types have a quit-
attempt rate of qs = 0.548, which we do not consider a biased estimate. Conditional on
attempting to quit, we assume that the cessation probability for S-types is γs = 0.317.
We view this as a lower bound (and hence a conservative estimate) as it equals the gross
rate we estimated for England, which itself will be a composite of complement (C) and
S-type cessation probabilities. The results for this scenario are shown in row 2 (and 7) of
Table 4. The difference in annual financial benefit between rows 1-2 (and 6-7) therefore
reflects: (i) that e-cigarettes are associated with more smokers attempting to quit and
(ii) that e-cigarettes give smokers attempting to quit an elevated chance of cessation.
The benefit of e-cigarettes in this scenario is estimated to be $5.7bn p.a. where d =
0.176, and $8.5bn p.a. where d = 0.264, which we argue are likely to be substantially
inflated if complementary use of e-cigarettes is ignored.
The latter post e-cigarette scenarios consider an increase to the cessation probability
117
but distributed differently depending upon the type of dual-user. Our survey shows that
37% of dual-users are C-types, who have the lower quit-attempt rate of qc = 0.396. We
then assume that C-types are less likely to cease smoking than a substitute type given
they attempt to quit. We take a parameter that scales this probability of cessation relative
to the same probability for S-types, and for simplicity we report three values of it: 1, 0.5
and 0; corresponding to the values γc = 0.317, 0.158 and 0.7 The results are reported
in rows 3-5 (and 8-10) of Table 4. Using the extreme parameter value of 1, row 3 (and
8) produces a scenario where the cessation probability for complement and substitute
types who are attempting to quit is identical. The difference in benefits between rows
2-3 of $0.9bn is then solely due to the lower rate at which complement types attempt to
quit. Using the other extreme value of 0 in row 5 (and 10) posits that complement types
have no chance of smoking cessation. Although extreme, it counterbalances the upward
bias that attributes the cessation probability change over 2011-14 all to e-cigarettes, as
discussed above. It is plausible then that the true value falls between these extremes,
where we report the results corresponding to the parameter value of 0.5 in row 4 (and 9).
The differences in benefits in rows 3-5 (and 8-10) are therefore solely due to the reduc-
tion in cessation probability of complement types. The central comparisons in benefits
we make are those between the supposed benefit of e-cigarettes that many may assume,
$5.7-8.5bn p.a., and the reduction in benefits implied by the presence of complement
types i.e., the difference between row 2 (7) and one of rows 3,4,5 (8,9,10). These com-
parisons are reported in the final column of Table 4 where we find that the presence of
complement types could reduce the financial benefit of e-cigarettes by up to $3.3bn p.a.
under the dual-use rate 0.176, and $4.9p.a. under 0.264.
7Notice that these terms satisfy Assumption 2 as Qs = 0.174, Qk = 0.062 and Qc ∈ [0, 0.125]
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Table 4
Cost-Benefit Analysis Scenarios
Scenario Dual-use
rate
Proportion
of C-types
Quit-attempt rates
(smokers, S-types, C-types)
Cessation probability of
those attempting to quit
(smokers, S-types, C-types)
Relative reduction
in cost-savings due
to C-types
Number of
smokers
ceasing
Annual
cost-savings
in USD
Absolute reduction
in cost-savings due
to C-types in USD
d pc (qk, qs, qc) (γk, γs, γc) (5) n nB
Conservative dual-use rate estimate
Pre EC n/a n/a (0.524, n/a , n/a ) (0.118, n/a , n/a ) n/a 2.60m 17.9bn n/a
Post EC with only 0.176 0 (0.524, 0.548, n/a ) (0.118, 0.317, n/a ) n/a 3.43m 23.6bn n/aS-type dual-users
Post EC with S and
C-type dual-users
0.176 0.37 (0.524, 0.548, 0.396) (0.118, 0.317, 0.317) 16% 3.30m 22.6bn 0.9bn
0.176 0.37 (0.524, 0.548, 0.396) (0.118, 0.317, 0.158) 37% 3.13m 21.5bn 2.1bn
0.176 0.37 (0.524, 0.548, 0.396) (0.118, 0.317, 0.000) 57% 2.96m 20.3bn 3.3bn
Higher dual-use rate estimate
Pre EC n/a n/a (0.524, n/a , n/a ) (0.118, n/a , n/a ) n/a 2.60m 17.9bn n/a
Post EC with only
S-type dual-users 0.264 0 (0.524, 0.548, n/a ) (0.118, 0.317, n/a ) n/a 3.84m 26.4bn n/a
Post EC with S and
C-type dual-users
0.264 0.37 (0.524, 0.548, 0.396) (0.118, 0.317, 0.317) 16% 3.65m 25.0bn 1.4bn
0.264 0.37 (0.524, 0.548, 0.396) (0.118, 0.317, 0.158) 37% 3.39m 23.3bn 3.1bn
0.264 0.37 (0.524, 0.548, 0.396) (0.118, 0.317, 0.000) 57% 3.13m 21.5bn 4.9bn
Notes. The terms in the second header row are from those from the model in Section 2.
Row 1 - Pre EC (E-cigarettes): Of smokers (no-EC) attempting to quit, 11.8% (2.60m) are successful, saving 2.60m × $6,865 p.a.
Row 2 - Post EC with only substitute (S) types: All dual-users are S-types who have a quit-attempt rate of 54.8% as informed by our survey. Those
attempting to quit are assumed to have the cessation probability 0.317.
Rows 3-5 - Post EC with S and complement (C) types: 37% of dual-users are C-types who have a quit-attempt rate of 39.6%, as informed by our
survey. C-types attempting to quit are assumed to have either the same cessation probability than S-types (0.317), half (0.158), or a zero chance of
cessation.
5. Conclusion
As detailed in the introduction, a great deal is made of the ability of e-cigarettes to
help smokers to quit. To the extent that they are a viable substitute for conventional
cigarettes this is undoubtedly true. Indeed, our work indicates that to most smokers
they are a substitute. Combining this with the reportedly lower health risks entailed in
smoking e-cigarettes, this generates a considerable benefit to society.
However, our study indicates that a substantial minority do not perceive e-cigarettes
as a substitute but rather, as a complement. This can significantly dampen the benefits
and may make some smokers worse off if they prolong smoking conventional cigarettes
as a result, potentially undermining regulation. Consider for instance a smoker who is
on the verge of quitting because of restrictions on smoking in the workplace, in social
situations and perhaps because of the stigma attached to smoking. E-cigarettes allow
such a smoker to continue smoking conventional cigarettes in private and in unregulated
public spaces, but to use e-cigarettes to access oral nicotine delivery in situations, places
or gatherings where real smoking is not possible.
We argue that longitudinal medical studies must not ignore the potential impact of
complementarity. It is only through including concerns such as complementarity, along-
side more visible concerns such as the potential gateway effect for non-smokers and any
long-term health impact, that a full appraisal of the societal impact of e-cigarettes will
be possible. In our own cost-benefit analysis we calculate that as much as 57% of the
possible health benefits of e-cigarettes (absent concerns about gateway or uncertainties
about the long-run health effects of e-cigarettes) may be removed through the effect of
complementarity.
A special note of concern is the interplay between the role of e-cigarettes and the
nature of regulation: increasing the degree of regulation of regular cigarettes will have a
knock-on effect on e-cigarette use but also on how complementary they become. Ignor-
ing this will result in a failure to predict correctly the impact of regulatory intervention.
Finally, we find that perceptions about complementarity differ significantly between
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non-smokers and dual-users. Dual-users are best placed to know the true level of com-
plementarity since they have consumption experience of both e-cigarettes and conven-
tional cigarettes. They return significantly higher levels of complementary use than
non-smokers perceive. This difference in perceptions is especially worrying given that
non-smokers make up the majority of the general population, likely including many
policy-makers and health experts.
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Supplementary Appendix
This appendix includes the transcript of the survey and a detailed description of the
cost benefit analysis methodology. We would not anticipate either being in the final
published paper but might be of use to referees and might be made available more
generally in the form of an (online only) supplementary appendix.
The survey was conducted using the online survey software Qualtrics. The question
numbers displayed here, along with the coded values shown in parentheses correspond
to the coding of the data as it is displayed in the results file available online. The
questions were organised in blocks. Which blocks participants saw depended on their
prior answers. We indicate any criteria to see a block. Within blocks, some questions
were also restricted to be shown only to participants giving particular prior answers.
Where there are such conditions, they are shaded.
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Block 1: All 
Q23 In order to participate in this research study, it is necessary that you give your 
informed consent. By responding you are indicating that you understand the nature of 
the research study and your role and that you agree to participate in the research. 
Please consider the following points before continuing: I understand that I am 
participating in research conducted by the University of Warwick. I understand the 
research team will use anonymized data in any presentations of the research results. 
Data will not be associated with individuals and any identifying data will then be 
destroyed. I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary, and that after 
the study data collection has begun, I may refuse to participate further without any 
penalty. By continuing I am stating that I am over 18 years of age, and that I have 
read the above information and consent to participate in this study being conducted. 
Please click "I agree" to agree that you have read and understood the information 
above: 
 I agree (1) 
 
Block 2: All 
Q24 Have you smoked at least 100 cigarettes in your entire life? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q32 Do you now smoke cigarettes at all, no matter how regularly? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Block 3: If Q32 = Yes 
Q25 Do you now smoke cigarettes every day or some days? 
 Every day (1) 
 Some days (2) 
 
If Q25 = Every day: 
Q27 About how many cigarettes do you smoke in a typical day? 
 
If Q25 = Some days: 
Q28 About how many cigarettes do you smoke in a typical week? 
 
Block 4: If Q24=Yes and Q32=No 
Q31 About how long has it been since you last smoked cigarettes? 
 0-3 months (1) 
 3-6 months (2) 
 6-12 months (3) 
 1-2 years (4) 
 2-3 years (5) 
 3-4 years (6) 
 4-5 years (7) 
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Q55 During the last period you smoked, did you smoke cigarettes every day or some 
days? 
 Every day (1) 
 Some days (2) 
 
If Q55 = Every day 
Q56 During this period, about how many cigarettes did you smoke in a typical day? 
 
If Q55 = Some days Is Selected 
Q57 During this period, about how many cigarettes do you smoke in a typical week? 
 
Block 5: All 
Q29 Have you tried Electronic Cigarettes or "E-cigarettes", even just one time? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
If Q29 = No 
Q40 Have you ever heard of Electronic Cigarettes or "E-cigarettes"? 
 Yes (4) 
 No (5) 
 
Block 6: If Q29=Yes 
Q30 Do you now use e-cigarettes every day, some days, or not at all? 
 Every day (1) 
 Some days (2) 
 Not at all (3) 
 
If Q30 = Every day 
Q31 About how many times do you use e-cigarettes in a typical day? 
 
If Q30 = Some days 
Q32 About how many times do you use e-cigarettes in a typical week? 
 
Block 7: If Q30=Not at all 
Q33 About how long has it been since you last used e-cigarettes? 
 0-3 months (2) 
 3-6 months (3)  
 6-12 months (4)  
 1-2 years (5) 
 2-3 years (6) 
 3-4 years (7) 
 4-5 years (9) 
 5+ years (10) 
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Q65 During the last period you used e-cigarettes, did you use them every day, some 
days or just one time? 
 Every day (1) 
 Some days (2) 
 Just one time (3) 
 
If Q65 = Every day 
Q66 During this period, about how many times do you use e-cigarettes in a 
typical day? 
 
If Q65 = Some days 
Q67 During this period, about how many times do you use e-cigarettes in a 
typical week? 
 
Block 8: If Q29=Yes or Q40=Yes 
Q41 No matter what your smoking history is, we are interested in your opinions. 
 
Q11 Below are some of the advantages that people often think electronic cigarettes 
have over conventional cigarettes. Please give us your opinion of the order of 
importance of these advantages by ranking them from 1 (most important) to 6 (least 
important). 
______ Lower health risks (9) 
______ No second hand smoke (10) 
______ Cheaper (11) 
______ Can use them in many public places (14) 
______ Less odor (12) 
______ Less risk of causing a fire (13) 
 
Q12 Below are some of the disadvantages that people often think electronic cigarettes 
have over conventional cigarettes. Please give us your opinion of the order of 
importance of these disadvantages by ranking them from 1 (most important) to 6 
(least important). 
______ Not the same experience as cigarettes (3) 
______ Unsure about health risks (2) 
______ Cost of equipment (1) 
______ Too addictive (4) 
______ Concern over product malfunction (5) 
______ Confusing number of brands and products (6) 
 
If Q29 = Yes 
Q23 Please indicate which point on the following scale best describes the reasons you 
use (or used/tried) electronic cigarettes: 
Reasons best described as: [-5,5] sliding scale to two decimal places as shown in Fig. 
1. Label over -5 read “To reduce the amount of regular cigarettes I smoke”, label over 
5 read “Sometimes it is not possible to smoke regular cigarettes”. 
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If Q29 = No 
Q25 Please indicate which point on the following scale best describes what you think 
the reasons are that people use electronic cigarettes: 
Reasons best described as: [-5,5] sliding scale to two decimal places. Label over -5 
read “To reduce the amount of regular cigarettes they smoke”, label over 5 read 
“Sometimes it is not possible to smoke regular cigarettes”. 
 
Q30 Considering the arguments for and against e-cigarettes, and that they may affect 
different people in different ways: Please use the slider below to indicate your opinion 
on how they will affect society on average? 
My opinion is best described as: [-5,5] sliding scale to two decimal places. Label over 
-5 read “negative effect”, label over 0 read “no net effect”, label over 5 read “positive 
effect”. 
 
Q31 If you would like to, please explain how you think e-cigarettes will impact 
society. (optional) 
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Block 9: Q32=Yes 
Q32 Have you used any of the following smoking-cessation services or 
products? (select all that apply, if any) 
 Smoking Cessation Methods 
 Currently (1) In the past (2) 
Doctor consultation (9)     
Counseling (10)     
Behavioral Therapy (11)     
Other non-medical method (12)     
Gum (2)     
Patches (4)     
Nasal Spray (5)     
Inhalers (6)     
Lozenges (7)     
Other medication (8)     
 
 
Q26 Would you describe yourself as someone who is currently trying to quit smoking 
cigarettes? 
 Yes (2) 
 No (3) 
 
Block 10: If Q32=No and Q24=Yes 
Q37 Have you used any of the following smoking-cessation services or 
products? (select all that apply, if any) 
 Smoking Cessation Methods 
 I have used the following: (1) 
Doctor consultation (9)   
Counseling (10)   
Behavioral Therapy (11)   
Other non-medical method (12)   
Gum (2)   
Patches (4)   
Nasal Spray (5)   
Inhalers (6)   
Lozenges (7)   
Other medication (8)   
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If Q29 = Yes and if Q37 has at least one item checked: 
Q38 When you compare e-cigarettes to any other cessation methods you used, which 
was more effective for you? 
Most effective for me: [-5,5] sliding scale to two decimal places. Label over -5 read 
“other methods”, label over 5 read “e-cigarettes”. 
 
Block 11: All 
 
Q43 Do you avoid certain unhealthy food or drink? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q27 Are you currently a member of a health club or fitness center? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q28 Do you pay into Medicare? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don't know (3) 
 
Q29 Do you pay into a private health insurance plan? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Don't Know (3) 
 
Q15 Are you male or female? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 
Q16 How old are you? 
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Q31 Which state do you primarily live in? 
 Alabama (1) 
 Alaska (2) 
 Arizona (3) 
 Arkansas (4) 
 California (5) 
 Colorado (6) 
 Connecticut (7) 
 Delaware (8) 
 District of Columbia (9) 
 Florida (10) 
 Georgia (11) 
 Hawaii (12) 
 Idaho (13) 
 Illinois (14) 
 Indiana (15) 
 Iowa (16) 
 Kansas (17) 
 Kentucky (18) 
 Louisiana (19) 
 Maine (20) 
 Maryland (21) 
 Massachusetts (22) 
 Michigan (23) 
 Minnesota (24) 
 Mississippi (25) 
 Missouri (26) 
 Montana (27) 
 Nebraska (28) 
 Nevada (29) 
 New Hampshire (30) 
 New Jersey (31) 
 New Mexico (35) 
 New York (32) 
 North Carolina (33) 
 North Dakota (34) 
 Ohio (36) 
 Oklahoma (37) 
 Oregon (38) 
 Pennsylvania (39) 
 Rhode Island (40) 
 South Carolina (41) 
 South Dakota (42) 
 Tennessee (43) 
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 Texas (44) 
 Utah (45) 
 Vermont (46) 
 Virginia (47) 
 Washington (48) 
 West Virginia (49) 
 Wisconsin (50) 
 Wyoming (51) 
 
Q17 Please indicate your household's annual pre-tax income. (US $) 
 0 - 9,999 (1) 
 10,000 - 19,999 (2) 
 20,000 - 29,999 (3) 
 30,000 - 39,999 (4) 
 40,000 - 49,999 (5) 
 50,000 - 59,999 (6) 
 60,000 - 69,999 (7) 
 70,000 - 79,999 (8) 
 80,000 - 99,999 (10) 
 100,000 or more (9) 
 
 
